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SOUND AND FURY SIGNIFYING NOTHING?:
JU¨RGEN BU¨SSOW’S BATTLE AGAINST
HATE-SPEECH ON THE INTERNET
ERIC T. EBERWINE*
Propaganda has only one object . . . to conquer the masses.  Every means that furthers
this aim is good; every means that hinders it is bad.1
The combination of hatred and technology is the greatest danger threatening mankind.2
Those who won our independence . . . believed that freedom to think as you will and to
speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth;
that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discus-
sion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious
doctrine.3
I. INTRODUCTION
Derek Black is a thirteen-year-old webmaster.  He is responsible
for designing his own web page, replete with eye-catching animated
graphics, articles about Martin Luther King, Jr., and a collection of
optical illusions.  Perhaps these are not unusual features for a teen-
ager’s web site.  However, Derek’s page takes on a darker meaning
because it is the “Kid’s Page” featured on Stormfront.org, (“Storm-
front”) a site run by his father, Don Black, promoting “White Pride
World Wide.”  Don Black, who succeeded David Duke as the leader
of the Ku Klux Klan in 1980, founded Stormfront on January 11,
1995.4  Since then, Stormfront has grown to become one of the In-
ternet’s most popular right-extremist web sites, boasting a traffic
* J.D., New York Law School (2003).
1. JOESEPH GOEBBELS, THE GOEBBELS DIARIES: 1942-1943 13 (Louis P. Lochner ed.
& trans., 1948).
2. SIMON WIESENTHAL, JUSTICE, NOT VENGEANCE 358 (Ewald Osers trans., Grove
Weidenfeld 1989).
3. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis and Holmes, JJ.,
concurring).
4. See http://www.stormfront.org (last visited Sept. 15, 2004).
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rank of 4,222 with 1,405 other linking sites.5  By way of compari-
son, the Anti-Defamation League’s web page, has a traffic rank of
22,109.6
Gary “Gerhard” Lauck publishes Nazi newspapers in twelve lan-
guages and offers a free download of Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf on
his web site Nazi-Lauck-nsdapao.com (“Lauck” or “Nazi-Lauck”).7
Lauck provides a wide selection of Nazi propaganda materials and
also sells Nazi memorabilia.  Although Lauck’s site does not enjoy
the popularity of Stormfront, Gary Lauck does have the distinction
of having been imprisoned for four years in Germany for inciting
racial hatred and disseminating illegal propaganda.8
Savvy right-extremists have adapted to advances in information
technology.  Specifically, they have utilized the Internet to prosely-
tize their hatred.  Stormfront’s astonishing popularity is an example
of this phenomenon.  Many of these web sites are located within the
United States, where the courts have emphatically provided the
highest level of protection to controversial Internet sites under the
First Amendment.9
The Internet is a truly global medium that is “ambient - no-
where in particular and everywhere at once.”10  Web sites such as
Stormfront, based in Palm Beach, Florida, and Nazi-Lauck, based in
Lincoln, Nebraska are simultaneously available around the world.
5. See http://www.alexa.com (last visited Sept. 14, 2003).  Alexa.com provides
free traffic rankings and data for Internet sites. See also Tara McKelvey, Father and Son
Team on Hate Site, at http://www.usatoday.com/life/2001-07-16-kid-hate-sites.htm (last
visited July 16, 2001).
6. See Anti-Defamation League at http://www.adl.org (last visited Sept. 15,
2004); see also http://www.alexa.com (last visited Mar. 25, 2003).  Other Alexa.com traf-
fic rankings for comparison:  ACLU.org 15,047; Wiesenthal.com 30,326; Tolerance.org
56,417.
7. See http://www.nazi-lauck-nsdapao.com (last visited Sept. 15, 2004).
8. Nancy Finkin, Nebraska’s Nazi, at http://www.net.unl.edu/~swi/pers/nazi.
html (Mar. 24, 1995).  Gary Lauck was convicted in Hamburg, Germany on August 22,
1996.  Lauck was arrested in Denmark and was extradited to Germany (Mar. 24, 1995).
See also http://www.alexa.com (last visited Sept. 14, 2003).  The traffic rank on the Nazi-
Lauck site on October 27, 2003 was 338,868. Id.
9. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002); Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Cyberspace Communications, Inc. v. Engler, 238 F.3d 420
(6th Cir. 2000); ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Reno II”), cert. granted, 532
U.S. 1037 (2001); ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999); Shea v. Reno, 930
F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 1113 (1997).
10. Reno II, 217 F.3d at 169 (quoting Doe v. Roe, 955 P.2d 951, 956 (Ariz. 1998)).
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Not all countries, however, afford the same constitutional protec-
tion for hate-speech as the United States Supreme Court.11  This
raises the following questions:  Should web sites based in the United
States and protected under the First Amendment be subject to reg-
ulation in foreign countries?  Or should countries with stricter
speech regimes be able to block web site content or even force the
content to be taken down and removed from servers in other coun-
tries?  In other words, should the First Amendment be the default
standard for free speech on the Internet?  Further, should the In-
ternet be thought of as an “American environment”?12
Germany’s response to these questions appears to be an em-
phatic Nein!  Du¨sseldorf District Government President Ju¨rgen Bu¨s-
sow has ordered all Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) in the
German State of Nordrhein-Westfalen (North Rhine-Westphalia) to
block user access13 to the U.S.-based Stormfront and Nazi-Lauck
sites.  Bu¨ssow’s Sperrungsverfu¨gung14 (hereinafter “Blocking-Order”)
has taken a highly controversial, and hotly debated stance on the
11. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding that the First
Amendment does not permit the government to impose special prohibitions on speak-
ers who express views on disfavored subjects.  The petitioner was charged with a viola-
tion of the St. Paul Bias Motivated Crime Ordinance, St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code
§ 292.02 (1990), for allegedly burning a cross in the yard of an African-American
family).
12. For example, one may argue that the interest is an “American Environment”
due to the concentration of power in the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (“ICANN”), incorporated and located in the United States. See generally John
Perry Barlow, The Accra Manifesto (Mar. 12, 2002), available at http://www.eon.law.
harvard.edu/ghana2002/icann.html (discussing the significant concentration of power
in ICANN).  ICANN is responsible for IP address space allocation, protocol parameter
assignment, domain name system management, and root server system management
functions). Id. See also John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace
(February 8, 1996), available at http://www.eff.org/Publications/John_Perry_Barlow/
barlow_0296.declaration (“Your legal concepts of property, expression, identity, move-
ment, and context do not apply to us.  They are based on matter.  There is no matter
here.”).
13. The term “user access” refers to Internet users in the general public.  Bu¨ssow’s
Sperrungsverfu¨gung does not apply when the prohibited sites are accessed for science,
research, or educational purposes. See Sperrungsverfu¨gung, v. 06.02.2002.
14. The Sperrungsverfu¨gung is an Administrative Order issued by the Du¨sseldorf
District Government.  The Sperrungsverfu¨gung is currently in force for all of North
Rhine-Westphalia pending further judicial review.
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question of racist and xenophobic content on the Internet.15  To
date, Bu¨ssow’s Blocking-Order has found near unanimous support
in German courts.
Ju¨rgen Bu¨ssow’s Blocking-Order is consistent with United Na-
tions and European Union attitudes towards regulating racist and
xenophobic speech.  The Blocking-Order in many ways is a local
reaction to the First Amendment protections afforded hate-speech
in the United States, as well as a reflection of unique social and
moral values forged in Europe following World War II.  The funda-
mental split in attitude towards hate-speech between the U.S., U.N.,
and E.U. forms a contextual backdrop for the more focused legal
debate developing in Germany.
In Germany, the debate turns on just how the Internet, or
more precisely Internet access, should be legally defined and there-
15. See Arved Greiner, Sperrungsverfu¨gungen als Mittel der Gefahrenabwehr im Internet,
8 COMPUTER UND RECHT [CR] 620 (2002); Bernd Holznagel and Stephanie Kussel, Mo¨g-
lichkeiten und Risiken bei der Beka¨mpfung rechtsradikaler Inhalte im Internet, 6 MULTIMEDIA
UND RECHT [MMR] 347 (2001); Bernd Holznagel, Meinungsfreiheit oder Free Speech im
Internet, 2 ZEITSCHRIFT FU¨R MEDIEN- UND KOMMUNIKATIONSRECHT 93 (2002); Michael
Hornig, Mo¨glichkeiten des Ordnungsrechts bei der Beka¨mpfung rechtsextremistischer Inhalte im
Internet- Zur Internet-Aufsicht auf der grundlage des § 18 Mediendienste-Staatsvertrags, 11 ZEIT-
SCHRIFT FU¨R URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT [ZUM] 846 (2001); Christian Koenig and Sas-
cha Loetz, Sperrungsanordnungen gegenu¨ber Network- und Access-Providern, 7 CR 438
(1999); Kristian Ko¨hntopp and Marit Ko¨hntopp, Sperrungen im Internet, 1 KOMMUNIKA-
TION UND RECHT [K&R] 25 (1998); Peter Mankowski, Die Du¨sseldorfer Sperrungsverfu¨gung-
alles andere als rheinischer Karneval, 5 MMR Editorial (2002); Andreus Neumann,
Ordnungsrechtliche Sperrungsverfuugungen und die Informationsfreiheit nach Art. 5 Abs. 1 S. 1
2. Alt. GG, (2002), available at http://www.artikel5.de/artikel/sperrunginffreiheit.html
(last visited Oct. 24, 2002); Gerhard Schneider, Die Wirksamkeit der Sperrung von Internet-
Zugriffen, 10 MMR 571 (1999); Ju¨rgen Schu¨tte, Sperrung von Internet-Seiten mit verbotenem
Inhalt- Und es geht doch 23 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] (2002); Gerald
Spindler and Christian Volkmann, Die o¨ffentlich-rechtliche Sto¨rerhaftung der Access-Provider,
8 K&R 398 (2002); Thomas Stadler, Sperrungsverfu¨gung gegen Access-Provider, 6 MMR 343
(2002); Thomas Stadler, Verantwortlichkeit fu¨r Hyperlinks nach der Neufassung des TDG,
INTERNET-ZEITSCHRIFT FU¨R RECHTSINFORMATIK, JurPC Web-Dok. 2/2003 (Jan. 13, 2003),
at http://www.jurpc.de/aufsatz/20030002.htm.; Andreus Zimmermann, Polizeiliche
Gefahrenabwehr und das Internet, 43 NJW 3145 (1999). See also Materialien zu: Internet-
Sperrungsverfu¨gungen, Deutsche Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Verteidigung der Information-
sfreiheit in Datennetzen [DAVID], at http://www.david-gegen-goliath.org (last visited
April 20, 2003); Internationaler Kongress “Hass und Gewalt im Internet,” Bezirksregierung
Du¨sseldorf, Landesanstalt fu¨r Medien Nordrhein-Westfalen (Sept. 17, 2002), at http://
www.brd.nrw.de/BezRegDdorf/hierarchie/themen/Sicherheit_und_Ordnung/
Medienmissbrauch/Internationaler_Kongress__Hass_und_Gewalt_im_Internet_.php
(last visited April 20, 2003).
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fore regulated.  The Federal Communications Commission and
courts in the United States have recently struggled with this ques-
tion as well.16  Is Internet access a telecommunications service, a
broadcast service, or something else entirely?  In Germany, the de-
bate is fueled by a separation of regulatory competence between
the Bund (federal government) and the La¨nder (German states).17
The Bund is responsible for regulating the means by which elec-
tronic media is distributed, including telecommunications.  The
La¨nder regulate content, including broadcasting, via a series of in-
ter-state treaties.
This Note examines the conflict between the German Bund
and the La¨nder concerning regulation of Internet service and, more
specifically, Internet content.  The development of German media
law supports the conclusion that State law — not federal law — will
control the issue of content regulation on the Internet.  Bu¨ssow’s
Blocking-Order is premised on State law, and to date, the adminis-
trative courts in Nordrhein-Westfalen have agreed that State law is
the proper foundation.  While ISPs in Nordrhein-Westfalen will un-
doubtedly appeal the administrative court decisions, finding that
Internet content may be subject to federal regulation would ulti-
mately require the German courts to reevaluate constitutional court
precedent and the German Constitution itself.
To that end, Part II of this Note explores the historical roles of
the Bund and La¨nder in regulating media through German constitu-
tional law and relevant case law.  Next, Part III demonstrates that
there is a fundamental conflict in legally defining Internet service
16. See, e.g., Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Verizon, 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 27
(D.D.C. 2003) (discussing that an ISP falls within one of four categories based on how
content has interacted with the service provider’s system or network); MediaOne v.
County of Henrico, 97 F. Supp. 2d 712 (E.D. Va. 2000)  (“MediaOne’s Road Runner
service contains news, commentary, games, and other proprietary content with which
subscribers interact as well as Internet access, and therefore it falls under the statutory
definition of ‘cable service.’”); AT&T v. Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000) (ISP
provides both an information and telecommunication service); FCC Inquiry Concerning
High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, GN Docket No. 00-185, FCC
00-355 (rel. Sept. 28, 2000); In Re Fed.-State Joint Bd. On Universal Serv., 13 FCC Rcd.
11501 (1998) (“Internet service providers themselves provide information services
. . . .”).
17. Timo Rosenkranz, Sperrungsanordnungen gegen Access-Provider, JurPC Web-Dok.
16/2003, (Feb. 3, 2003) ¶4 INTERNET-ZEITSCHRIFT FU¨R RECHTSINFORMATIK, at http://
www.jurpc.de/aufsatz/20030016.htm.
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and Internet content under existing German law, namely the
La¨nder’s Staatsvertrag u¨ber Mediendienste (Mediendienste-Staatsvertag)18
(“State Treaty on Media Services” or “MDStV”), and the Bund’s
Gesetz zur Regelung der Rahmenbedingungen fu¨r Informations- und Kom-
munikationsdienste (Informations- und Kommunikationsdienste-Gesetz)19
(“IuKDG”).  The conflict in legislative competence between the
Bund and  La¨nder is discussed within the greater context of conflict
in regulatory attitudes with the United States.  Part IV analyzes the
legality and applicability of either Bund or La¨nder statutory law to
Bu¨ssow’s Blocking-Order through a statutory comparison, legal crit-
icism of the Blocking-Order, and ultimately recent German court
decisions interpreting Bu¨ssow’s Blocking-Order.  Finally, Part V ar-
gues that Ju¨rgen Bu¨ssow’s Blocking-Order is likely to survive subse-
quent judicial scrutiny in Germany, with the result that German
ISPs in Nordrhein-Westfalen will be forced to block user access to
racist and xenophobic web sites originating in the United States.
This conclusion is supported by the unique development of Ger-
man media law, constitutional law, and the criminal code, as well as
U.N. and E.U. law.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF GERMAN MEDIA LAW
Legislation often reflects the state of media technology at the
time it was drafted, and therefore often fails to anticipate new tech-
nological developments.20  It is no surprise that there are unique
challenges in regulating the Internet, which at times incorporates
or closely mimics older forms of media, such as broadcasting or
telecommunications, but is simultaneously a completely new form
of mass media.  It is therefore important to recognize the unique
German approach to regulating traditional media, not only in
terms of legislative competence, but also with regard to how the
18. Staatsvertrag u¨ber Mediendienste [State Treaty on Media Services] [MDStV],
v. 20.01.1997 (BerlGVB1. S. 360), amended by v. 12.12.2001 (BerlGVB1 S. 162).
19. Gesetz zur Regelung der Rahmenbedingungen fu¨r Informations- und Kom-
munikationsdienste (Informations- und Kommunikationsdienste- Gesetz) [Statute on
the General Conditions of Information and Communication Services] [IuKDG], v.
13.06.1997 (BGB1. I S. 1870-1879).
20. Katja Stamm, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht und die Meinungsfreiheit, [The Consti-
tutional Court and the Freedom of Opinion], Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B37-38/2001
at 24 (2001).
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German Constitution has been applied to mass media.  The follow-
ing discussion will highlight the most important legal developments
in German media law, and will provide a framework for analyzing
the legality and potential success of Ju¨rgen Bu¨ssow’s Blocking-
Order.
A. The Basic Law and Basic Rights
After World War II, the process of democratization began in
Germany.  In September 1948, members of the German parliamen-
tary council began to draft a new constitution, and on May 23, 1949
Germany’s Grundgesetz, or Basic Law, went into effect.21  Not sur-
prisingly, the new Basic Law included strong reactions against  Nazi
ideology, including strong affirmations of equality, personal honor,
and freedom of expression.22
The Grundrechte, or Basic Rights, form the cornerstone of the
Basic Law.  The central purpose of the Basic Rights section is to
protect the individual’s “sphere of freedom” from encroachment by
the state.23  The Basic Rights create an objective system of values
focused on the freedom of a human being to develop in society,
and these rights “apply as a constitutional axiom throughout the
whole legal system: must direct and inform legislation, administra-
tion, and judicial decision.”24  Further, private law may not conflict
with the Basic Rights, and judges must consider the “radiant effect”
of the Basic Rights on private law and implement the values inher-
ent in constitutional law.25
Article 5 of the Basic Law addresses freedom of expression and
freedom of the press.26  With Nazi control as a backdrop, it became
clear that broadcasting freedom demanded freedom from central-
ized state control.27  In particular, the principle of broadcasting
freedom was deemed to be incompatible with pre-publication cen-
21. Grundgesetz [GG] [Constitution] v. 23.5.1949  (BGB1. I, 2470 (F.R.G.).
22. Grundgesetz [GG] arts. 1-5 (F.R.G).
23. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitu-
tional Court] BVerfGE 7, 198 (1958) (F.R.G.) [hereinafter Lu¨th].
24. Id.
25. Id. See Stamm, supra note 20; see also Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassung-
sgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] BVerfGE 90, 241-55 (1994)
(F.R.G.) [hereinafter Auschwitzlu¨ge], infra, note 81.
26. Grundgesetz [GG] [Constitution] art. 5.
27. ERIC BARENDT, BROADCASTING LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 34 (1993).
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sorship by government.28  Indeed, Article 5 of the Basic Law specifi-
cally proscribes censorship29 as well as attempts to restrict access to
information.30
The German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht)
held that broadcasting freedom (Rundfunkfreiheit) is an instrumen-
tal freedom (dienende Freiheit) serving the more fundamental free-
dom of speech.31  Broadcasting freedom should be protected as
long as it promotes the goals of free speech, namely an informed
democracy and the discussion of a wide variety of views.32  Broad-
casting freedom, therefore, is not an unlimited freedom, but in-
stead is balanced against a social conception of free speech in
society.33  Thus, it is permissible to restrict broadcasting freedom in
order to protect the greater goal of a free democratic society.
B. Separation of Power: Foundations in Broadcasting Law
Freedom from state control and censorship is a prominent fea-
ture in the structure of German broadcasting.  In First Television34
the German Constitutional Court underscored the importance of
freedom from state control when it held that the federal govern-
ment’s foundation of Deutschland-Fernsehen GmbH ran afoul of the
Basic Law’s distribution of powers between the federal and state
28. Id.
29. Grundgesetz [GG] art. 5(1) (“Eine Zensur findet nicht statt”) [There shall be
no censorship].
30. Id. (“und sich aus allgemein zuga¨nglichen Quellen ungehindert zu unter-
richten”) [and to inform himself without hindrance from generally accessible sources].
31. See BARENDT, supra note 27, at 34. See also Grundgesetz [GG] art. 5(1) (“Free-
dom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films shall be
guaranteed.”). See also Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE]
[Federal Constitutional Court] BVerfGE 57, 295 (320) (1981) (F.R.G.) [hereinafter
Third Broadcasting]; Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Fed-
eral Constitutional Court] BVerfGE 73, 118 (152) (1986) (F.R.G.) [hereinafter Fourth
Broadcasting].
32. See BARENDT, supra note 27, at 34; See also Grundgesetz [GG] art. 5(1).
33. Grundgesetz [GG] [Constitution] art. 5(2) (“These rights shall find their lim-
its in the provisions of general laws, in provisions for the protection of young persons,
and in the right to personal honor.”).
34. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitu-
tional Court] BVerfGE 12, 205 (1961) (F.R.G.) [hereinafter First Television].
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government and the fundamental principle of broadcasting free-
dom guaranteed under Article 5.35
First Television emphasized the separate roles of the federal and
state governments in broadcasting.  The Constitutional Court deter-
mined that under Article 73(7) of the Basic Law, the federal gov-
ernment has the authority to regulate the establishment and
operation of broadcasting transmission facilities.36  The Court
found that broadcasting transmitters are part of the telecommuni-
cations system within the meaning of Article 73(7), but that the
telecommunications system only comprises the technical steps in
the transmission of broadcasting presentations.37  Within the mean-
ing of Article 73(7), the telecommunications system comprises the
technical requirements whose regulation is necessary for the effi-
cient operation of broadcasters and the reception of their pro-
grams.38  Specifically, the federal government is granted authority
under Article 73(7) to assign frequencies and regulate other techni-
cal aspects of transmission technology.39
Because the federal government’s authority to regulate broad-
casting is limited to technical aspects of transmission under the def-
inition of telecommunications in Article 73, it follows that the same
distinction in federal regulatory authority must apply to other Arti-
cles within the Basic Law.  Article 5 of the Basic Law uses the term
“Broadcasting,” which according to the Constitutional Court,
means broadcasting as an institution.40  Article 5 does not permit
the assumption that the term “telecommunications system” covers
broadcasting as a whole, but may only apply to those areas that
serve the conveyance of presentations, assignment of licenses and
frequencies or transmission technology.41
35. See BARENDT, supra note 27, at 35. Deutschland-Fernsehen GmbH was to be a na-
tional television station owned by the Federal government.
36. First Television, BVerfGE 12, 205. See Grundgesetz [GG] art. 73 (Gegensta¨nde
der ausschließlichen Gesetzgebung) [Subjects of exclusive legislative power] (“Der
Bund hat die ausschließliche Gesetzgebung u¨ber . . . das Postwesen und Telekom-
munikation”) [“The Federation shall have exclusive power to legislate with respect to
. . . postal and telecommunication services”].
37. First Television, BVerfGE 12, 205.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. See also Grundgesetz [GG] art. 5(1).
41. First Television, BVerfGE 12, 205 at D(II).
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Further, the court found that as a medium of mass communi-
cation, broadcasting belongs “in the neighborhood of press and
film.”42  Indeed, Article 5 refers to press, film, and broadcasting in
the same sentence.43  While Article 75(2) expressly provides for the
federal government’s legislative competence in the general legal af-
fairs of press and film, broadcasting is not mentioned.44  As such,
the federal government may enact framework provisions dealing
with the general legal affairs of the press and film, but it is not enti-
tled to exclusive legislative competence for broadcasting as a
whole.45
Regarding the general structure of legislative competence of
the federal and state governments, the Basic Law operates under
the principal that the states have primary competence.46  The fed-
eral government only has legislative competence to the extent that
the Basic Law endows it.47  In cases of doubt regarding the jurisdic-
tion of the federal government, there is no assumption under the
Basic Law that argues in favor of federal competence.48  The gen-
eral principal “Bundesrecht bricht Landesrecht” or “Federal Law breaks
State Law” in Article 31 of the Basic Law is applicable only if the
federal government has specific legislative competence over the
states.49  Relevant here, the federal government has no constitu-
tional competence to regulate mass-communications, and as such
federal law may not pre-empt state law governing mass-communica-
42. Id.
43. Grundgesetz [GG] art.5(1) (“Die Pressefreiheit und die Freiheit der Ber-
ichterstattung durch Rundfunk und Film werden gewa¨hrleistet.)” [Freedom of the
press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films shall be
guaranteed.]).
44. First Television, BVerfGE 12, 205. See Grundgesetz [GG] art. 75 (Rahmenvor-
schriften) [Areas of federal framework legislation].
45. First Television, BVerfGE 12, 205 at D(II). See Grundgesetz [GG] art. 75
(Rahmenvorschriften) [Areas of federal framework legislation].
46. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitu-
tional Court] BVerfGE 10, 89 (101) (1959) (F.R.G.).
47. Grundgesetz [GG] art. 70(1).
48. First Television, BVerfGE 12, 205 (“[T]he Basic Law calls for a strict interpreta-
tion of arts. 73ff. Basic Law”).
49. Cornelius von Heyl, Jugendschutz im Internet- Mit Software gegen harte Sachen-
Fachtagung des Ministeriums fu¨r Kultur, Jugend, Familie und Frauen Rheinland-Pfalz, at
http://www.jugendschutz.net/Schaubilder_29-05-982.htm. (May 29, 1998).
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tions.50  This distinction will weigh heavily in analyzing the applica-
bility of state law in regulating Internet content.
The Constitutional Court found that broadcasting is also a cul-
tural phenomenon.51  To the extent that cultural matters can be
administered and regulated by the state,52 they nevertheless fall, in
accordance with the Basic Law’s fundamental decision,53 in the
area of the states54 when special provisions of the Basic Law do not
provide restrictions or exceptions in favor of the federal govern-
ment.  This fundamental decision by the Basic Law, which is in ef-
fect a decision in favor of a federalist structure promoting
separation of powers within the State, forbids, especially in the area
of cultural matters, the assumption that the federal government has
jurisdiction without a sufficiently clear, contrary rule of
exception.55
The Constitutional Court determined that broadcasting is a
“public function” and not a function of the centralized federal gov-
ernment in accordance with the development of German law.56  In
founding Deutschland-Fernsehen GmbH, the federal government
violated Article 30 in conjunction with Article 83 of the Basic Law.57
The Court stated that broadcasting in Germany is a public service
under public responsibility.58  The broadcasting of programs as a
function of public administration is covered by the delineation of
competencies between the federal government and the states.59  As
a form of public service, the states, a more local form of govern-
ment, have exclusive jurisdiction over broadcasting content.
In subsequent cases, the Constitutional Court emphasized that
freedom from state control requires the legislature to frame some
50. Id.  See also Rosenkranz, supra note 17, at 4.
51. See von Heyl, supra note 49.
52. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts BVerfGE  10, 20 (36f).
53. Grundgesetz [GG] arts. 30, 70, 83.
54. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts BVerfGE 6, 309 (354).
55. First Television, BVerfGE 12, 205 at D(II).
56. Id.
57. Id.  Except as otherwise provided or permitted by this Basic Law, the exercise
of state powers and the discharge of state functions is a matter for the La¨nder. See
Grundgesetz [GG] art. 30; see also Grundgesetz [GG] art. 83 (noting that the La¨nder
shall execute federal laws in their own right insofar as this Basic Law does not otherwise
provide or permit).
58. See Grundgesetz [GG] arts. 30, 83.
59. Id.
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basic rules ensuring that the state government is unable to exercise
any influence over the selection, content, or scheduling of pro-
grams.60  The Fourth61 and Sixth Television62 cases struck down state
law provisions which allowed the state government or licensing au-
thority unlimited discretion in allocating permits and frequencies,63
thereby acknowledging the danger that the executive could choose
between applicants on the basis of their programming.64
C. Pluralism
In addition to the restriction of state influence, the German
Constitutional Court took measures to ensure pluralism in broad-
casting.  The Third Television case re-emphasized that freedom of
broadcasting “is a freedom serving the freedom of formation of
opinion in the latter’s subjective and objective legal elements:
Under the conditions of modern mass communication, it forms a
necessary addition and reinforcement of this freedom; it serves the
mandate of ensuring free, comprehensive formation of opinion by
way of broadcasting.”65  It is the responsibility of the legislature to
ensure that a positive regulatory order exists to ensure that public
opinion is expressed in broadcasting as widely and completely as
possible.66  To achieve this goal, substantive, organizational, and
procedural rules are necessary to give effect to the guarantee of
broadcasting freedom mandated by Article 5(1) of the Basic Law.67
However, the mandate flowing from Article 5 of the Basic Law
that freedom of broadcasting be given a legal structure does not
give any authority to restrict that basic right.68  The rights guaran-
teed in the first paragraph of Article 5 are only limited by Article
5(2), which provides that broadcasting freedom may be limited in
accordance with provisions of general laws, the provisions of law for
the protection of youth, and by the right to inviolability of personal
60. See BARENDT, supra note 27, at 35.
61. Fourth Broadcasting,  BVerfGE 73, 118 (1986).
62. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitu-
tional Court] BVerfGE 83, 238 (1991) (F.R.G.) [hereinafter Sixth Broadcasting].
63. See BARENDT, supra note 27, at 35.
64. Sixth Television, BVerfGE 83, 118 (1991).
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honor.69  This provision is the basis for all speech restrictions in
Germany.
The court continued, stating that the Basic Law did not con-
template a particular form of organization of broadcasting.70  The
sole issue should be that free, comprehensive, and truthful forma-
tion of opinion is guaranteed, and that the legislature provide safe-
guards to ensure that broadcasting is not left to the mercy of one or
several societal groups, that all relevant societal forces have their
say, and that the freedom of reporting remains unimpaired.71
To further ensure that the pluralistic values of public broad-
casting are protected, controlling broadcasting authorities are
charged with determining balanced programming schedules.72
The broadcasting authorities, or Rundfunkra¨te, are composed of
members representing a wide variety of interest groups in order to
prevent the domination of the media by a particular political party
or commercial interest.73 First Television emphasized the need for
adequate rules to ensure that all significant social forces can exer-
cise influence on the administration of public broadcasting authori-
ties.74  While the court did not exclude some state representation
on the broadcasting authorities, Article 5 of the Basic Law did pre-
clude state control, whether direct or indirect.75  Indeed, La¨nder
statutes governing the composition of broadcasting authorities have
generally provided for balanced representation of all significant po-
litical, cultural, and industrial groups to ensure a broad range of
impartial programs.76
It is clear that the principal developments in German broad-
casting law will be broadly applied to Internet regulation.  Whether
69. Id. See generally Grundgesetz [GG] Part I, (Die Grundrechte) [Basic Rights];
see also Stamm, supra note 20, at 20.
70. See Stamm, supra note 20, at 20.
71. Id.
72. See BARENDT, supra note 27, at 60.
73. Id.
74. First Television, BVerfGE 12, 205, 261-62.
75. See BARENDT, supra note 27, at 60.
76. Id.  The Rundfunkrat must be composed of 42 members, of which 17 mem-
bers must be from such social groups and institutions as the Evangelical Church in
Nordrhein-Westfalen, the Catholic Church, the State Association of the Jewish Religious
Community, and the German Trade Union of Nordrhein-Westfalen. See, e.g., Gesetz
u¨ber den “Westdeutschen Rundfunk Ko¨ln” (WDRG) [“Code on the German Broadcast-
ing Co., Cologne”], v. 25.04.1998 (GV NW S. 265/SGV NW 2251), art. II, § 15.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-1\NLR104.txt unknown Seq: 14 15-DEC-04 8:40
366 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
the federal government will continue to be limited to regulation of
the physical means of transmission while the La¨nder are permitted
to make decisions regarding Internet content is a primary issue ad-
dressed in this article.  Traditionally, German media law manifests a
strong desire to protect pluralism and prevent the domination of
the media by any one political or commercial interest.  At the same
time, broadcasting is free of censorship, but subject to limitation by
other general laws, including constitutional protections laid down
in the Basic Law, provisions in the Criminal Code, and youth pro-
tection laws.  Some of the tensions between state and federal regula-
tory authority, the reach of the freedom of speech, and youth
protection issues are discussed in the following cases.
D. Recent Cases on the Road to Bu¨ssow’s Blocking-Order
Article 1 of Germany’s Basic Law proclaims: “Human dignity
shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all
state authority.”77  Article 2 of the Basic Law covers personal free-
doms, stating that “[e]very person shall have the right to free devel-
opment of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of
others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral
law.”78  Article 3 covers equality before the law, declaring that “[n]o
person shall be favored or disfavored because of sex, parentage,
race, language, homeland and origin, faith, or religious or political
opinions. No person shall be disfavored because of disability.”79
Notwithstanding some apparently conflicting constitutional
protections, Germany has taken a strong stance against racism and
xenophobia, as reflected in the Basic Law and the German Crimi-
nal Code.  For example, certain political parties, such as the Nazi
party (NSDAP), are illegal in Germany, as is the display of Nazi par-
aphernalia and propaganda.80 As the following case illustrates, Ba-
sic Rights under the Basic Law are not always absolute.
77. Grundgesetz [GG] art. 1(1).
78. Id. art. 2(1).
79. Id. art. 3(3).
80. See Grundgesetz [GG] art. 21(2) (“Parties that . . . seek to undermine or abol-
ish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany shall be unconstitutional.”).  The political party Sozialistische Reichspartei
upheld the Fu¨hrerprinzip, an anti-democratic organizational structure, and the party’s
close relationship to the former NSDAP disregarded fundamental human rights, espe-
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Auschwitzlu¨ge (“Auschwitz Lie”) held that a statement denying
the Holocaust was not protected speech under Article 5 of the Basic
Law.81  According to the Constitutional Court, the fundamental
right protected under Article 5 of the Basic Law is freedom of opin-
ion.82  However, freedom of opinion is not unconditionally guaran-
teed. General laws may restrict the right to freedom as well as other
Basic Rights, such as personal honor.83  In interpreting a statute
limiting the freedom of opinion, the court must balance the value
of freedom of opinion along with the legal interest which the stat-
ute restricting the basic right serves.84
Assertions of fact are, strictly speaking, not statements of opin-
ion.85  The protection of assertions of fact ends at the point where
they cease to contribute anything to the formation of opinion that
is presupposed under constitutional law.86  Incorrect information is
not an interest worthy of protection under Article 5.87  An assertion
of fact known or proved to be untrue is not covered by the protec-
tion of freedom of opinion.88  The court concluded that a state-
ment asserting there was no persecution of the Jewish persons in
the Third Reich is an assertion of fact, which has been proven un-
true by countless eyewitness reports, documents, criminal trial ver-
dicts, and the findings of history.89  Accordingly, assertion of such
cially the dignity of man, the right to the free development of personality, and the
principle of equality before the law.  Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
[BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] BVerfGE 2, 1 (1952) (F.R.G.); Strafgesetz-
buch [StGB] [Criminal Code] v. 15.05.1871 (RGB1. S. 127),  amended by v. 22.08.2002
(BGB1. 1, 3390) §§ 86, 86(a) (making illegal the dissemination of propaganda and use
of symbols of unconstitutional organizations).
81. Auschwitzlu¨ge, BVerfGE 90, 241-55 (1994).
82. Id. at B(II)(1).
83. Id. at B(II)(1)(c).
84. Id.  See also Lu¨th, BVerfGE 7, 198, 208 (1958) (F.R.G.).




89. Grundgesetz [GG] art. II(2)(b); compare Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (observing that some classes of speech “are no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality.”); but see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (White, J.,
concurring) (“[B]y characterizing fighting words as a form of ‘debate’, the majority
legitimates hate speech as a form of public discussion.”).
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content does not enjoy the protection of freedom of opinion.90  Al-
though the Auschwitz Lie case does not specifically address Internet
content, it is useful to illustrate the German attitude towards right-
extremist ideology and propaganda.
The introduction of the Internet in Germany resulted in sev-
eral judicial attempts to control illegal Internet content.  In Com-
puServe, the local court in Munich (Amtsgericht Mu¨nchen) held that
the managing director of CompuServe Germany, Felix Somm, was
personally liable under criminal law91 for child pornography lo-
cated on a news server of CompuServe USA and accessible in Ger-
many.92  The Local Court based its decision on the grounds that
CompuServe Germany was granting access to child pornography via
its parent affiliate in the U.S. when CompuServe USA had failed to
block access to the child pornography despite having knowledge of
the content and the technological means to block access to it.93  Fe-
lix Somm was sentenced to two years probation for the dissemina-
tion of pornography.94  The Munich Court of Appeals (Landgericht
Mu¨nchen) reversed the decision in 1999.95  Some of the reasons
given for the reversal include the fact that CompuServe Germany
was completely subordinate to CompuServe USA and therefore had
no control over the web site, and that the mere knowledge of the
existence of the web site was not sufficient to constitute willful con-
duct.  In addition, CompuServe Germany could not be considered
a “guarantor” of the unlawful content merely by granting access to
such content.96
90. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (concluding, after employing a balancing test,
that if statements of opinion containing assertions of fact are proved to be untrue, then
the freedom of opinion takes second place to the protection of personality); but see
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional
Court] BVerfGE 90, 1 1994) (F.R.G.) (holding that statements about guilt and responsi-
bility for historical events pose a question of complex judgments which can not be re-
duced to an assertion of facts, while the denial of the event itself will generally have the
character of an assertion of facts).
91. §§ 184 Nr.3 StGB, § 14Nr. 1 StGB, § 25 Nr.2 StGB.
92. Entscheidungen des Amtsgericht Mu¨nchen in Strafsachen [Munich Local
Court] Az. 8340 Ds 465 Js 173158/95 (1995) [hereinafter CompuServe I].
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Entscheidungen des Landgericht Mu¨nchen I in Strafsachen [Munich State
Court I], 20 Ns 465 Js 173158/95 (1999) [hereinafter CompuServe II].
96. Id.
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The CompuServe Court never approached the issue of legislative
competence between the Bund and La¨nder; it simply qualified Com-
puServe Germany as an ISP under section 3(1) of the Federal Tele-
Services Law, or Teledienstegesetz (TDG).97  The Court could have ar-
guably applied the State Treaty on Media Services because Internet
newsgroups qualify as Media Services, not Tele-Services.98  The
CompuServe court never discussed the applicability of the MDStV,
a question which would become a centerpiece of the dispute over
Bu¨ssow’s Blocking-Order.
In December 2000, the German Federal High Court
(Bundesgerichtshof)99 upheld the conviction100 of an Australian
citizen, Dr. Fredrick Toben, for denial of the Holocaust, a criminal
offense under German law,101 even though the incriminating docu-
ments were located and disseminated from an Internet server lo-
cated in Australia.102  Toben, a director and founder of the
Adelaide Institute, published a series of circulars and articles on the
Institute’s web site promoting revisionist theories of the Holocaust,
including a claim that “the original count of 4 million dead from
Auschwitz . . . can be lowered to 800,000 at the highest.  This alone
is already good news, because it means that approximately 3.2 mil-
lion people did not die in Auschwitz — a reason to celebrate.”103
In an open letter sent to a judge and the Berlin newspaper
Sleipnir,104 Toben proclaimed:  “I visited Auschwitz in 1997, and I
have come to the conclusion based on my own investigation that
97. Id.
98. Lothar Determann, The New German Internet Law, 22 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP.
LAW REV. 113 (1998).
99. [BGHSt] [Supreme Court], 1 StR 184/00 (2000).
100. Entscheidungen des Landgericht Mannheim, 5 Große Strafkammer [Mann-
heim State Court, 5 Chamber] 5 KLs 503 Js 9551/99 (1999).
101. § 130 Nr. 3 StGB (containing the “Auschwitzlu¨ge” provision which makes it a
crime for anyone to publicly, or in a collection, condone, lie about, or play down past
deeds of the Nazis in a way that will disturb the public peace by promoting hatred
against a particular part of the population or damaging the human dignity). See also
Auschwitzlu¨ge, BVerfGE 90, 241-55 (1994).
102. BGHSt 1, 184; see also Jones v. Toben [2002] FCA 1150 (Federal Court of Aus-
tralia, New South Wales District Registry).
103. BGHSt 1, 184 at Internet Example II.1.  The article was posted between April
1997 and March 1999. But see Toben, [2002] FCA 1150 at 18, 19 (indicating article was
posted in March 1996 and crediting Jean Claude Pressac with the statistics).
104. Sleipnir, Journal of History, Culture, Politics is considered a right-extremist news-
paper and is currently being prosecuted in Germany. Sleipnir can be accessed at http:/
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during the war years the camp never had gas chambers in opera-
tion.”105  Finally, Toben posted a paper claiming that “looking back
on five years of work, we can firmly conclude:  the Germans have
never exterminated European Jews in lethal gas chambers in KL
Auschwitz or other locations.  Therefore, all Germans and people
with German heritage can live without a guilt complex being forced
upon them — a way of thinking that has maliciously enslaved them
for a half century.”106
The court’s ruling was based on the grounds that the relevant
text could be read and further disseminated in Germany and was
thus capable of disturbing public order.107  The Federal High Court
expressly pointed out that the ruling was limited to the criminal
liability of the author himself and should not be applied to ISPs.108
Both CompuServe and Toben demonstrate the willingness of Ger-
man courts to apply German law to illegal content on Internet serv-
ers located outside German borders but accessible within Germany.
While the CompuServe I decision was eventually reversed,109 and the
Toben case ruling was limited to the criminal liability of the au-
thor,110 there have been no German cases to date successfully hold-
ing ISPs liable for the dissemination of unlawful hate-speech.
However, in neighboring France, an attempt was made to hold
the U.S.-based Yahoo!, Inc. (“Yahoo!”) liable for allowing access to
Nazi and extremist propaganda and paraphernalia via its auction
site based in the United States.  The French case against Yahoo!, as
detailed in the following paragraphs, has been cited by the Du¨ssel-
/www.sleipnir.netfirms.com (last visited Sept. 15, 2004).  Netfirms, which hosts Sleipnir,
is located in Toronto, Canada.
105. BGHSt 1,184  (Internet Example II.2, article posted in August 1998).
106. Id.  (Internet Example II.3 Posted December 1999-January 2000).
107. Id. Compare Toben, [2002] FCA 1150 at 18 (concluding that “the act of placing
text and graphics on a web site which is not password protected is an act of publication,
or perhaps more accurately an act which causes repeated publications . . . .”); see also
Court of Cassation, Section V:  Penal, Judgment No. 47141 (2000) (Italy) (holding
there are no national boundaries for libel on the Internet).
108. Id. See also “Verbreitung der Auschwitzlu¨ge im Internet” [Spreading the Au-
schwitz Lie in the Internet], at http://www.eee.medien-recht.com/luege.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 9, 2002); “BGH: Volksverhetzung im Internet strafbar” [BGH:  Incitement of
the People in the Internet punishable], at http://www.publex.de/cgi-bin/recht.cgi/Ak-
tuell/news00121200.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2002).
109. CompuServe II, 20 Ns 465 Js 173158/95.
110. Id.
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dorf District Government as a reason for forcing ISPs in Germany
to block access to web sites featuring prohibited content.  The Ya-
hoo! case demonstrated, in the eyes of the district government, that
enforcement of a German court decision against an American ISP
would ultimately prove futile.
La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et l’Antisemitism (“LICRA”) and
L’Union Des Etudiants Juifs De France (“UESF”) filed a civil complaint
against  Yahoo! in the Tribunal de grande Instance de Paris for viola-
tion of Section R645-1 of the French Criminal Code which prohib-
its the exhibition of Nazi propaganda and artifacts for sale.111  The
complaint stemmed from Yahoo!’s auction site which allows anyone
in the world to post an item for sale and solicit bids from any In-
ternet user around the world.112  Yahoo!, however, does not actively
regulate the content of each posting; therefore, some individuals
have posted highly offensive material on the auction site.  Yahoo! is
incorporated in the state of Delaware, and operates regional web
sites, including Yahoo! France.113
The French court found that a large number of Nazi and Third
Reich related objects were being offered for sale on the Yahoo! auc-
tion site.114  Because any French citizen was able to access those
materials on Yahoo.com directly or via a link on Yahoo.fr, the
111. Yahoo!, Inc. v. LICRA, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001) [hereinafter
LICRA I] rev’d 379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter LICRA II]. LICRA II reversed
the district court’s decision due to a lack of in personam jurisdiction over LICRA and
UEJF.  The court of appeals held “[j]urisdiction may be obtained, and the First Amend-
ment claim heard, once LICRA and UEJF ask a U.S. district court to enforce the French
judgment.”  While this decision raises a host of interesting issues of personal jurisdic-
tion, it does not substantively alter the district court’s analysis of Yahoo!’s First Amend-
ment claim relevant to this article. See Sakura Mizuno, When Free Speech and the Internet
Collide: Yahoo!-Nazi-Paraphernalia Case, 10 CURRENTS:  INT’L TRADE L.J. 56 (2001); see also
Benoıˆt Frydman and Isabelle Rorive, Fighting Nazi and Anti-semitic Material on the Internet:
The Yahoo! Case and its Global Implications, Keynote Address at the Cardozo School of Law
during the Conference: “Hate and Terrorist Speech on the Internet: The Global Impli-
cations of the Yahoo! Ruling in France” (Feb. 11, 2002), at http://www.pcmlp.socleg.
ox.ac.uk/YahooConference (last visited Sept. 17, 2002). But see “French Court Rules in
Favor of Yahoo in Internet Free Speech Case,” Center for Democracy & Technology, at
http://www.cdt.org/jurisdiction (Feb. 11, 2003) (holding that Yahoo! never tried to
“justify war crimes [or] crimes against humanity.”  Please note that the Paris court dis-
missed criminal charges against Yahoo! and former CEO Tim Koogle).
112. LICRA I, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181.
113. Id. See http://www.yahoo.fr (last visited Sept. 15, 2004).
114. LICRA I, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181.
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French Court concluded that Yahoo was in violation of Section
R645-1 of the French Criminal Code.115  The French Court ordered
Yahoo! to:
(1) eliminate French citizens’ access to any material on
the Yahoo.com auction site that offers for sale any Nazi
objects, relics, insignia, emblems, and flags; (2) eliminate
French citizens’ access to web pages on Yahoo.com dis-
playing text, extracts, or quotations from Mein Kampf and
Protocol of the Elders of Zion; (3) post a warning to French
citizens on Yahoo.fr that any search through Yahoo.com
may lead to sites containing prohibited by Section R645-1
of the French Criminal Code, and that such viewing of
the prohibited material may result in legal action against
the Internet user; (4) remove all browser directories ac-
cessible in the French Republic index headings entitled
“negationists” and from all hypertext links the equation of
“negationists” under the heading “Holocaust.”116
The order also subjected Yahoo! to a fine of 100,000 Euros for each
day it failed to comply with the order.117
Yahoo! appealed to the French court to reconsider the terms
of the order, claiming that it could comply with the warning re-
quirement on Yahoo.fr, but that the requirements regarding Ya-
hoo.com were technologically impossible.118  The French court
solicited an expert opinion and subsequently reaffirmed its or-
der.119  Yahoo! complied with the warning and changed its auction
guidelines, but as of October 24, 2001, Nazi memorabilia could still
be found for sale on the Yahoo! auction site.120
Yahoo! predictably appealed the French decision in the United
States, claiming that it lacked the technology to block French citi-
zens from accessing the Yahoo! auction site or from accessing other
Nazi-based content of web sites on Yahoo.com121  Yahoo! claimed
that such a ban on content would “infringe impermissibly upon its
115. Id. at 1184.




120. LICRA I, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1185 n.3-4.
121. Id. at 1185-86.
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rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.”122  As a result, Yahoo! filed a complaint seeking a declaratory
judgment that the French court’s orders are neither cognizable nor
enforceable under U.S. law.123
The issue considered by the U.S. court was whether it was “con-
sistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States for an-
other nation to regulate speech by a U.S. resident within the United
States on the basis that such speech can be accessed by Internet
users in that nation.”124  The court stated that it “must and will”
decide the case in accordance with the U.S. Constitution and laws,
and recognized that in so doing it “adopts certain value judgments
embedded in those enactments, including the fundamental judg-
ment expressed in the First Amendment that it is preferable to per-
mit the non-violent expression of offensive viewpoints rather than
to impose viewpoint-based governmental regulation upon
speech.”125  The court further noted that both “the government
and people of France have made a different judgment based on
their own experience” and that the court did not intend to disre-
spect French judgment or experience.126
The U.S. court concluded the French order violated the First
Amendment.  “The French order prohibits the sale or display of
items based on their association with a particular political organiza-
tion and bans the display of web pages based on the author’s view-
point regarding the Holocaust and anti-Semitism.”127  “A United
States court could constitutionally not make such an order.”128
“The First Amendment does not permit the government to engage
in viewpoint-based regulation of speech absent a compelling gov-
ernmental interest, such as averting a clear and present danger of
imminent violence.”129  In addition, the French order was “far too
general and imprecise to survive the strict scrutiny required by the
First Amendment.”130  Phrases such as “all necessary measures” and
122. Id. at 1186.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1187.
126. LICRA I, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1186.
127. Id. at 1189 (citing  Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)).
128. Id. at 1189.
129. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
130. LICRA I, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1189.
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“render impossible” instructed Yahoo! to undertake efforts that
would impermissibly “chill” or “censor protected speech.”131
The court then considered whether it could enforce the
French order without violating the First Amendment.132  No legal
judgment has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of sover-
eignty from which its authority is derived.133  The extent to which
the United States or any state honors the judicial decrees of a for-
eign state is a matter of choice governed by the “comity of na-
tions.”134  Comity “is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the
one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will on the other.”135
U.S. courts will generally recognize foreign judgments and decrees
unless enforcement would be prejudicial or contrary to U.S. inter-
ests.136  “The Court noted that the Internet allows one to speak in
more than one place at the same time.”  France has the sovereign
right to regulate permissible speech within France, but a French
order that violates the protections of the First Amendment by “chil-
ling” protected speech that simultaneously occurs within U.S. bor-
ders may not be enforced by a U.S. court.137  The Court concluded:
Absent a body of law that establishes international stan-
dards with respect to speech on the Internet and an ap-
propriate treaty or legislation addressing enforcement of
such standards to speech originating within the United
States, the principle of comity is outweighed by the
Court’s obligation to uphold the First Amendment.138
As the aforementioned case demonstrates, federal court prece-
dent has now been established that would, in effect, allow a U.S.
based ISP or content provider to escape the enforcement of an or-
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1190.
133. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738 (2004).
134. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); see also Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d
805, 807-08 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing how judgments of foreign courts are not auto-
matically entitled to recognition or enforcement in American courts); Ackerman v. Le-
vine, 788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986); Laker Airways Ltd v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines,
731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
135. Guyot, 159 U.S. at 164.
136. Sompertex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d
Cir. 1971); see also Guyot, 159 U.S. at 164, 193; Ackerman, 788 F.2d at 841.
137. LICRA I, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1192.
138. Id. at 1193.
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der given by a foreign court so long as the content at issue is pro-
tected under the First Amendment.  The message of the case,
Yahoo! Inc. v. LICRA was not lost on Ju¨rgen Bu¨ssow.
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND JU¨RGEN BU¨SSOW’S CRUSADE
AGAINST AMERICAN EXTREMISTS
It is often the case that what is illegal offline is also illegal on-
line.  This is particularly true regarding child pornography in the
U.S. and in Europe.  Europe and the United States, however, di-
verge sharply on the question of whether racist and xenophobic
speech should be legal to publish or distribute via the Internet.
There is a fundamental and inescapable difference between the le-
gal treatment afforded racist and xenophobic speech under the
American First Amendment and U.N., E.U., and German law.
Racist and xenophobic content online fall within the sphere of
Internet content regulation in Europe.139  One of the principal
challenges facing Internet content regulation is the “fundamental
clash” between the United States and Europe.140  The First Amend-
ment of the American Constitution provides that “Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press.”141  The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that racist
and xenophobic propaganda are protected under the First Amend-
ment as constitutionally protected forms of controversial political
speech.142  Generally speaking, governmental authorities are pro-
hibited from imposing liability on ISPs for racist and xenophobic
content, either on the Internet or via traditional media.143
139. Isabelle Rorive, Strategies to Tackle Racism and Xenophobia on the Internet- Where
are We in Europe?, 7 INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 8 (2002); see also Gianluca Esposito, Racist
and Xenophobic Content on the Internet- Problems and Solutions, 7 INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y
9 (2002).
140. Id.
141. U.S. CONST, amend. I.
142. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); United States v. Playboy
Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826 (2000) (“The history of the law of free
expression is one of vindication in cases involving speech that many citizens may find
shabby, offensive, or even ugly.”).
143. 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(c) (2004) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as a publisher or speaker of any information provided by an-
other information content provider.”); Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327,
330 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that Congress created “a federal immunity to any cause of
action that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-
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Attitudes towards racist and xenophobic speech outside the
United States are far less tolerant.  On a supra-national level, the
United Nation’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
states “any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that con-
stitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be
prohibited by law.”144  The U.N. International Convention on the Elimi-
nation of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (“ICERD”) provides that
signatory states “shall declare an offense punishable by law all dis-
semination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, [and] in-
citement to racial discrimination . . . .”145  In addition, the 2001
U.N. Conference against racism in Durban, South Africa made
clear that Internet content should not be excluded from regula-
tion.146  The United States, however, is not bound to follow the
U.N. provisions.147
Consistent with U.N. legislation, Europe has also enacted law
proscribing racist and xenophobic speech.  According to Article 10
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms148 and the case law of the European Court of Human
Rights, the right to free speech does not extend to speech that
party user of the service”). See also, Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993);
Wilson v. Superior Court, 532 P.2d 116 (1975).
144. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 20-22
145. International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, Jan. 4, 1969 art. 4(a).  Germany signed the ICERD in 1969).
146. Rorive, supra note 139, at 5.
147. When the United States signed ICERD on September 28, 1966, it noted that
“nothing in the Convention shall be deemed to require or to authorize legislation or
other action” by the U.S. that is “incompatible” with the U.S. Constitution.  When the
United States ratified ICERD on October 21, 1994, the Senate states: “The Constitution
and laws of the United States contain extensive protections of individual freedom of
speech, expression and association.  Accordingly, the United States does not accept any
obligation under this Convention, in particular under articles 4 and 7, to restrict those
rights, through the adoption of legislation or any other measures, to the extent that
they are protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”  United Nations
Treaty Collection, Declarations and Reservations, United States of America declaration
(Feb. 5, 2002) available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty2_asp.htm.
148. United Nations Treaty Collection, Declarations and Reservations, United
States of America Declaration (Feb. 5, 2002), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/
menu3/b/treaty2_asp.htm.  The freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 10
“carries with it duties and responsibilities, [which] may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a dem-
ocratic society . . . for the prevention of disorder or crime, for protection of health or
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others . . . .” art. 10(2).
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threatens, denies or leads to the destruction of human dignity and
human integrity.149  Further, Article 17 of the Convention states
that none of its provisions grant the right to engage in any activity
that aims at destroying rights and freedoms of others.150
Germany also has strong national laws that vigorously protect
fundamental human rights and dignity, and proscribe actions and
information advocating forms of racism and xenophobia.151 Com-
puServe and Toben demonstrate the willingness of German courts to
protect German citizens from illegal Internet content.152  However,
in both instances, the ISP itself, the conduit through which the pro-
hibited content was accessed, was specifically held not liable.153
Given that many, if not most authors of illegal web content are
unidentifiable or unreachable, there has been increasing pressure
to either enlist the voluntary support of ISPs in restricting access to
illegal web sites, or force the ISPs to filter and block access to illegal
content.154  As the Council of Europe considers a proposal outlaw-
ing the publishing of hate-speech on the Internet,155 Du¨sseldorf
149. Rorive, supra note 139, at 2.
150. United Nations Treaty Collection, Declarations and Reservations, United
States of America Declaration (Feb. 5, 2002) at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/
b/treaty2_asp.htm. See also, Rorive, supra note 139, at 2.
151. See Grundgesetz [GG] art. 1(1) § 130, available at http://www.dejure.org/
gesetze/StGB/130.html (translated through http://www.google.com) (last visited Nov.
3, 2003).
152. See CompuServe I, Az. 8340 Ds 465 Js 173158/95.
153. See CompuServe II, 20 Ns 465 Js 173158/95.
154. See Benoıˆt Frydman and Isabelle Rorive, Racism, Xenophobia and Incitement On-
line: European Law and Policy, Programme in Comparative Media Law and Policy, Oxford
University-Wolfson College, at http://www.selfregulation.info/iapcoda/rxio-back-
ground-02093.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
155. Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime Concerning the
Criminalization of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed through Com-
puter Systems, Strasbourg, Jan. 28, 2003, Europ. T.S. No. 189, at http://www.conven-
tions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/189.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).  Article 3
of the Additional Protocol would require each Party to “adopt such legislative or other
measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offenses under its domestic law,
when committed intentionally and without right, the following conduct:  distributing,
or otherwise making available, racist and xenophobic material to the public through a
computer system.”  Paragraph 23 of the Explanatory Report attached to the Additional
Proposal says, “ ‘Distribution’ refers to the active dissemination of racist and xenopho-
bic material . . . to others, while ‘making available’ refers to the placing on line of racist
and xenophobic material for the use of others.  This term also intends to cover the creation or
compilation of hyperlinks in order to facilitate access to such material.” Id. at Explana-
tory Report, Nov. 7, 2002, ¶28, at http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Trea-
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District Government President Ju¨rgen Bu¨ssow has taken aggressive
steps to force ISPs operating in Nordrhein-Westfalen to block ac-
cess to U.S.-based racist web sites.156  Bu¨ssow’s Sperrungsverfu¨gung,
or “Blocking-Order,” of February 8, 2002, specifically ordered ISPs
based in Nordrhein-Westfalen to immediately block all access to the
right-extremist Stormfront and Nazi-Lauck web sites157  The Block-
ing-Order finds legal footing in the Mediendienste-Staatsvertag
(State Treaty on Media Services), a body of German state law that
was drafted, in part, as a reaction to the CompuServe cases and a
recognition of the need for laws applicable to new media.158
Should the First Amendment be the default standard for le-
gally protected speech on the Internet?  Ju¨rgen Bu¨ssow has an-
swered that question with his Blocking-Order.  Will other German
La¨nder follow his lead?  Will other E.U. Members?  First, the legality
of the Blocking-Order must be analyzed under existing German
statutory and case law within the broader context of German media
law precedent.  If Bu¨ssow’s Blocking-Order survives judicial scru-
tiny, it is important to consider the impact it will have on ISPs
worldwide, and perhaps more importantly, whether the United
States can afford to remain an island of protection for racists and
xenophobes.
ties/Html/189.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2003) (emphasis added).  It should also be
noted that under Paragraph 45 of the Explanatory Report, which comments on Article
7 of the proposal (Aiding and abetting), an ISP “that does not have criminal intent
cannot incur liability under this section.”  Further, Article 7 imposes no duty on an ISP
to actively monitor content in order to avoid criminal liability. See also Proposal for a
Council Framework Decision on Combating Racism and Xenophobia, Commission of
the European Communities, 2001/0270(CNS), at http://www.europa.eu.int/eurlex/
en/com/pdf/2001/com2001_0664en01.pdf (Nov. 11, 2001).
156. Sperrungsverfu¨gung [Blocking-Order], Bezirksregierung Du¨sseldorf [District
Government Du¨sseldorf], AZ 21.50.30 [hereinafter Sperrungsverfu¨gung], available at
http://www.nps-brd.nrw.de/BezRegDdorf/hierarchie/aufgaben/Abteilung_2/
Dezernat_21/Medienmissbrauch/Rechtsextremismus_im_Internet_Die_Sperr7072.
php (Feb. 6, 2002). See also Press Release, Bezirksregierung Du¨sseldorf erla¨sst Blocking-
Orderen wegen rechtsextremischer Angebot im Internet, Pressemitteilung available at
http://www.brd.nrw.de/BezRegDdorf/hierarchie/index.php (Feb. 8, 2002).
157. Sperrungsverfu¨gung, supra note 156, at 1.
158. Andreus Neumann, Das neue Multimediarecht- Einleitung zu IuKDG und
MDStV, Oct. 31, 2002, available at http://www.mathematik.uni-marburg.de/~cyberlaw/
texte/multimediarecht.html (translated through http://www.google.com) (last visited
Nov. 3, 2003).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF BU¨SSOW’S BLOCKING-ORDER:  SOUND AND FURY
SIGNIFYING NOTHING?
A. Regulatory Competence of the Bund and La¨nder:  German
Statutory Law Applicable to the Internet
Germany is wrestling with the difficult problem of how to regu-
late the Internet.  Currently, there are twenty statutory codes gov-
erning online services in Germany.159  Fortunately, nearly the same
rules apply throughout Germany because the individual La¨nder
codes resemble federal law.160  As the Television and Broadcasting
cases illustrate, content regulation in mass media has been subject
to a fundamental separation of power between the sixteen German
La¨nder and the Federal Bund.161
The split in regulatory competence between the La¨nder and
the Bund manifested itself in 1996 as the La¨nder began an initiative
to draft a “State Treaty on Media Services” and the Bund drafted a
proposal for the “Information and Communications Services Law”
(IuKDG).162  Almost immediately, the Bund and La¨nder began to
argue about the limits of their respective legislative authority.163  A
series of controversial discussions between the Bund and La¨nder oc-
curred concerning the limits of state and federal authority to regu-
late online services.164  On the basis of a Compromise-paper passed in
June, 1996, the La¨nder claimed for themselves the regulatory au-
thority for Media Services.165  The Bund, on the other hand, would
regulate online services that supplemented or replaced existing
telecommunications services, known collectively as Tele-Services.166
The final versions of the MDStV167 and the IuKDG came into force
159. See Determann, supra note 98, at 129.
160. Id.
161. See First Television, BVerfGE 12, 205 at D(II).
162. Neumann, supra note 158, at 1.
163. Id. at 2. See also George M. Bro¨hl, Rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen fu¨r neue Infor-
mations- und Kommunikationsdienste, CR, 73-74 (1997).
164. Thomas Hoeren, Grundzu¨ge des Internetrechts 95 (Verlag C.H. Beck, 2001).
165. Id.
166. Determann, supra note 98, at 137.
167. Staatsvertrag u¨ber Mediendienste [State Treaty on Media Services] [MDStV],
v. 20.05.1997 (NWGVB1 S. 134, BerlGVB1. 1997) amended by v. 20.12.2001 (GVB1. Ber-
lin 2002, S. 162), available at http://www.mdstv.de (translated through http://www.
google.com) (last visited Nov. 3, 2002).  All sixteen Bundesla¨nder signed the MDStV
between January 20 and February 12, 1997.  It should be noted here that a revised
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between January and June 1997.168  An analysis of Bu¨ssow’s Block-
ing-Order must begin with a comparative examination of the rele-
vant statutory provisions of the MDStV and the IuKDG.
The federal IuKDG incorporates two new statutes specifically
dealing with Tele-Services.169  First, there is a specific code on Tele-
Services, the Teledienstegesetz (TDG), and a code applying to data
protection in connection with Tele-Services, the Teledienstedaten-
schutzgesetz (TDDSG).  The TDG is the IuKDG code most relevant
to an analysis of the Blocking-Order.  The IuKDG also amends
some existing federal statutes, including the German penal code
(StGB),170 the Youth Protection Media Law (GjS),171 and the intel-
lectual property code (UrhG).172  The StGB and UrhG are cur-
rently applicable to all online services, including those defined as
either Tele-Services or Media Services.173  However, most provisions
in the GjS apply only to Tele-Services.174
The MDStV was uniformly enacted by all sixteen German
La¨nder as state code governing Media Services.  The MDStV con-
tains provisions on the same topics covered under federal law, in-
version of the MDStV went into effect on July 1, 2002.  Differences in the section num-
bers between MDStV 1997 and MDStV 2002 will be noted parenthetically when
relevant.
168. Gesetz zur Regelung der Rahmenbedingungen fu¨r Informations- und Kom-
munikationsdienste (Informations- und Kommunikationsdienste-Gesetz) [Statute on
the General Conditions of Information and Communications Services] [IuKDG] v.
22.07.1997 (BT-Drs. 13/7934), available at http://www.netlaw.de/gesetze.iukdg.htm
(translated through http://www.google.com) (last visited Nov. 3, 2002) (passed by the
German Bundestag on June 13, 1997).
169. See IuKDG, 22.07.1997.
170. Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] v. 15.5.1871 (RGB1. S. 127), amended by v. 22.08.2002
(BGB1. I, 3390).
171. Gesetz u¨ber die Verbreitung jugendgefa¨hrdender Schriften und Medien [Law
Against the Distribution of Materials Endangering Minors] [GjS], v. 29.04.1961,
(amended 22.07.1997).
172. Gesetz u¨ber Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte (Urheberrechtgesetz)
[Intellectual Property Code] [UrhG], v. 09.09.1965 (BGB1. I S, 1273), amended by v.
01.09.2000 (BGB1. I S. 1374).
173. Determann, supra note 98, at 129.
174. Id.  The GjS content-based speech restrictions have only been extended to
Tele-Services.  GjS § 7(a) requires a Youth Protection Officer to be appointed for all
ISPs, including providers of Media Services.  This extension was criticized by the
Bundesrat. See Bundestagsdrucksache [Federal Parliament Document] [BT-Drs], 13/
7285, 52; see also BT-Drs 13/7385, 70.
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cluding ISP liability, data protection, and protection against violent
and pornographic content.175
Both the IuKDG and the MDStV apply simultaneously in each
of the sixteen La¨nder.176  The applicability of the IuKDG or the
MDStV to a particular online service depends on whether the ser-
vice is qualified as a “Tele-Service”177 or as a “Media Service.”178
The distinction between the definitions of Tele-Services and Media
Services is difficult because the technology covered by the IuKDG
and the MDStV is already similar.179  The spectre of technological
convergence adds to the difficulty in distinguishing new media
technology from the more traditional forms of media.180
In addition to problems arising from technological similarities,
the legal definitions of Tele-Services and Media Services are ex-
tremely vague.181  To further complicate matters, the examples out-
lined by the legislatures in the TDG and MDStV fail to clarify these
definitions and actually overlap.182
Tele-Services are defined as “all electronic information and
communication services which are designed for the individual use
of combinable data such as characters, images or sounds and are
based on transmission by means of telecommunication (Tele-Ser-
vices).”183  The legislative history of the TDG suggests that it was
175. Determann, supra note 98, at 131.
176. Id. at 137. See also Grundgesetz [GG] art. 74 I(11) (assigning the legislative
power to regulate commerce to the federal Bund without limitation to interstate or
foreign commerce).
177. See Gesetz u¨ber die Nutzung von Telediensten (Teledienstegesetz) [Act on the
Utilization of Tele-Services] [TDG], v. 22.07.1997 (BGB1. I S. 1870), amended by v.
27.06.2000 (BGB1. I S. 897), § 2.  (The Tele-Services Act was enacted as Art. 1 of the
Information and Communication Services Act [IuKDG], v. 22.07.1997 (BT-Drs. 13/
7934).
178. See § 2 MDStV (1997, 2002).
179. Determann, supra note 98, at 137.
180. See generally Rundfunkstaatsvertrag [Interstate Broadcasting Agreement]
[RStV] v. 31.08.1991 (Berl1. 1991 S. 309), amended by v. 6. July/7. Aug. 2000 (BerlGVB1.
2000 S. 447), § 2(1).
181. Determann, supra note 98, at 138.  Definitions are found in sections 2 of the
IuKDG and MDStV, respectively.
182. Id. at 138-39.  The definitions are contained in § 2(1) TDG and § 2(1) MDStV
(1997, 2002).  The examples can be found in § 2(2) TDG and § 2(2) MDStV (1997,
2002). See also von Heyl, supra note 49, at 1; Rosenkranz, supra note 17, at 3.
183. § 2(1) TDG (“Die nachfolgenden Vorschriften gelten fu¨r alle elektronischen
Informations- und Kommunikationsdienste, die fu¨r eine individuelle Nutzung von
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intended to cover primarily commercial services offering individual
communications and services based on individual requests, rather
than services disseminated to the public like broadcasting or cable
television.184
However, non-commercial services can also qualify as Tele-Ser-
vices.185  Under § 2(2) TDG, examples of Tele Services include in
particular:  (1) services offered in the field of individual communi-
cation (e.g., tele-banking, data exchange); (2) services offered for
information or communication unless the emphasis is on editorial
arrangement to form public opinion (data services providing e.g.
traffic, weather, environmental and stock exchange data, the dis-
semination of information on goods and services); (3) services pro-
viding access to the Internet or other networks; (4) services offering
access to telegames; and (5) goods and services offered and listed in
electronically accessible data bases with interactive access and the
possibility for direct order.186  Notes accompanying the government
draft of TDG § 2 provide additional examples of Tele-Services, in-
cluding: discussion forums, tele-commuting, tele-medicine, tele-
learning, home pages, search engines, mail-order businesses, bro-
ker services, and consulting services.187
Media Services are defined as the offering and use of informa-
tion and communications services by the public, in text, sound or
image, transmitted via electromagnetic waves.188  The phrase “trans-
mitted via electromagnetic waves” immediately suggests traditional
broadcasting technology inconsistent with the digital world of the
Internet.  Indeed, the State Broadcasting Treaty (RStV) defines
broadcasting as the provision and transmission for the general pub-
lic of presentations of all kinds of speech, sound and picture, using
kombinierbaren Daten wie Zeichen, Bilder oder To¨ne bestimmt sind und denen eine
U¨bermittlung mittels Telekommunikation zugrunde liegt (Teledienste).”).
184. Determann, supra note 98, at 139; compare § 2(2)(4) MDStV (1997, 2002)
(“On-demand Services”).
185. § 2(3) TDG.
186. § 2(2) TDG (emphasis added).
187. Determann, supra note 98, at 139. See also BT-Drs 13/7385, 18-19.
188. § 2(1) MDStV (1997, 2002) (“Dieser Staatsvertrag gilt fu¨r das Angebot und die
Nutzung von an die Allgemeinheit gerichteten Informations- und Kommunikation-
sdiensten (Mediendienste) in Text, Ton oder Bild, die unter Benutzung elek-
tromagnetischeer Schwingungen ohne Verbindungsleitung oder la¨ngs oder mitttels
eines Leiters verbreitet werden.”).
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electromagnetic waves without junction lines or by means of a con-
ductor.189  However, this apparent conflict is undone in the exclu-
sion provisions of both the MDStV and the RStV.  The MDStV
specifically provides that the regulations of the RStV remain unaf-
fected.190  The RStV also provides that it does not apply to Media
Services as defined in § 2 of the MDStV.191
Having somewhat awkwardly extricated itself from the world of
traditional broadcasting, the MDStV proceeds to provide examples
of Media Services.  In particular, the MDStV applies to the follow-
ing:  (1) distribution services in the form of direct offers to the pub-
lic for the sale of goods or furnishing of services, including real
property, rights and duties, for consideration (Tele-shopping); (2)
distribution services, to which results of data inquiry are distributed
in text or image with or without a carrier tone; (3) distribution ser-
vices in the form of television text, radio text and similar text ser-
vices; and (4) on demand services, where performance is conveyed
for use on request from electronic storage in text, sound or image,
with the exception of such services where individual performance
or the pure conveyance of data is predominant, except
telegames.192
The baseline provisions of the TDG and MDStV make clear
that similar technology is contemplated in both codes.  The ques-
tion, for the purposes of this article, is which code applies to ISPs.
Section 2(2)(3)TDG specifically says that the Tele- Services are “ser-
vices providing access to the Internet or other networks.”  It sounds
very much like the TDG should prevail.  However, the devil is often
in the exceptions to the rule.  Section 2(4)(3)  TDG specifically ex-
cludes “content provided by distribution and on-demand services if
the emphasis is an editorial arrangement to form public opinion
pursuant to § 2 of the Interstate Agreement on Media Services (Me-
dia Services Treaty) . . . .”  Further, the TDG also excludes telecom-
189. § 2(1) RStV (“Rundfunk is fu¨r die Allgemeinheit bestimmte Veranstaltung
und Verbreitung von Darbietungen aller Art in Wort, in Ton und in Bild unter
Benutzung elektromagnetischer Schwingungen ohne Verbindungsleitung oder la¨ngs
oder mittels eines Leiters.”).
190. § 2(1) MDStV (1997, 2002).
191. § 2(1) RStV.
192. § 2(2) MDStV (1997, 2002).  Please note that “individual performance” is the
author’s translation, and can be understood as the one-on-one exchange of goods and
payments.
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munications services and the commercial provision of
telecommunications services, as well as traditional broadcasting.193
Therefore, if ISPs provide either distribution services or on-demand
services, they fall under the regulatory umbrella of the MDStV, and
thus are subject to regulation through Ju¨rgen Bu¨ssow’s Blocking-
Order.
Recalling the distinction in German media law between the au-
thority of the Bund to regulate means (e.g., frequency allocation)
and the authority of the La¨nder to regulate content, it is not surpris-
ing there is a similar tension concerning Internet regulation.  Prior
German case law indicates longstanding support for this separation
of power, and to allow Internet content regulation to fall under the
purview of a federal statute would clearly be contradictory to tradi-
tional legal thinking.  The debate surrounding the applicability of
the IuKDG or the MDStV has been hotly contested in Germany.
B. An Overview of Bu¨ssow’s Blocking-Order
The storm clouds began to gather in Nordrhein-Westfalen
months before the Du¨sseldorf District Government issued its initial
order to ISPs to block extremist web pages.194  Ju¨rgen Bu¨ssow indi-
cated early on that he believed the district government could regu-
late the access to extremist web sites under the MDStV.195  In
October 2001, Bu¨ssow invited local ISPs via a written invitation to a
hearing where the legal basis for blocking extremist web sites under
the MDStV would be clarified.196
193. § 2(4)(1)-(2) TDG.  The TDG excludes “Telecommunications” as defined
under § 3 of the Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG) and broadcasting under §2 of the
Rundfunkstaatsvertrag (RStV).
194. See Strafen fu¨r Provider fu¨r rechtsextreme Internetseiten, 26.08.2000, at http:/
/www.heise.de/newsticker/data/jk-26.08.00-005/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2003); Online-
Anbieter sollen Nazi-Sites sperren, 28.05.2001, at http://www.heise.de/newsticker/
data/em-28.05.01-000/ (last visited Nov. 3 2003).
195. Id.  Bu¨ssow indicates that should ISPs continue to offer extremist web sites,
they could face fines up to 500,000 DM under the MDStV.
196. See Anho¨rung- Aufsicht nach dem Mediendienste-Staatsvertrag (MDStV), AZ
21.50.20, Bezirksregierung Du¨sseldorf, 04.10.2001.  The Anho¨rung issued by the District
Government Du¨sseldorf can be understood as a draft proposal for the later Blocking-
Order.  The provisions are largely identical, with the notable exception that http://
www.rotten.com was not listed as one of the prohibited web sites in the Blocking-Order.
Another site originally listed in the Anho¨rung was http://www.front14.org, which was
defunct by the time the Blocking-Order was issued). See also Nordrhein-westfa¨lische
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Bu¨ssow released the Blocking-Order in February 2002.197  The
Blocking-Order begins with a recital of legal authority granted
under the MDStV giving the district government oversight of ISPs
and Internet content.  The Blocking-Order states that ISPs fall
within the definition of “Provider” under § 3(1) MDStV.198
As such, the district government has the authority under the
MDStV to regulate ISPs and the content accessible via their net-
works.199  In particular, § 18(1) MDStV grants the district govern-
ment the power of oversight for youth protection purposes
pursuant to § 8 MDStV.200
Under MDStV § 18, the Blocking-Order ordered ISPs to block
access to Stormfront and Nazi-Lauck.201 Stormfront is an American
service provider which exclusively hosts right-extremist Internet
sites, for the most part in English.  Stormfront offers several services
for a fee, such as server space, data transfer and email addresses
with individual domain names.202  Stormfront clearly expresses its
right-extremist point of view, declaring “White Pride World Wide,”
and offers a German language section featuring an article advocat-
ing censorship-free “Free Zones.”203  The Stormfront homepage
provides access to various services, links, a “Kids Page,” and a
“Women’s Page,” all of which promote racist ideology.204  The
Provider sollen Nazi-Web sites ausfiltern, 08.10.2001 http://www.heise.de/newsticker/
data/hod-08.10.01-001 (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
197. Press Release, Bezirksregierung Du¨sseldorf erla¨sst Sperrungsverfu¨gungen
wegen rechtsextremischer Angebote im Internet, 42/2002 (Feb. 8, 2002), at http://
www.brd.nrw.de/BezRegDdorf/hierarchie/index.php.
198. Sperrungsverfu¨gung, AZ 21.50.30, 06.02.2002, at 1.  “ ‘Provider’ means natural
or legal persons or associations of persons who make available either their own or third-
party media services or who provide access to the use of media services.” MDStV § 3(1)
(1997). Please note that the definition of “provider” in § 3(1) TDG is identical to
MDStV except that the word “Tele-Services” is substituted for “Media Services.”
199. Sperrungsverfu¨gung, supra note 156, at 1.
200. Id. See § 7 MDStV (1997) (Content, Duty of care to a child, Opinion Poll);  see
also § 8 MDStV (1997) (Prohibited Media Services, Youth Protection); see also §9
MDStV (1997) (Advertising, Sponsoring); see also §§ 11, 12, 13, 22(1) MDStV (2002).
201. § 22 MDStV (2002).
202. See White Nationalist Community, at http://www.stormfront.org (last visited
Sept. 15, 2004).
203. Id. See also Sperrungsverfu¨gung, supra note 156, at 1.  Please note that a “Free
Zones” article found on the Stormfront site features the phrase “wir bestrafen
Abweichler und Feinde” [“we punish deviants and enemies”].  The same phrase was
selected to appear in the Blocking-Order.
204. http://www.stormfront.org (last visited Sept. 15, 2004).
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Blocking-Order concludes that the site, on the whole, is aimed at
building and influencing public opinion.205  The determination
that a site contains editorial content intended to influence public
opinion has a direct bearing on whether the site can be regulated
under the MDStV or under the TDG.  Further, the many available
links constitute the informational equivalent of a “Lazy Susan” for
the German right-extremist scene.206
According to the Blocking-Order, Stormfront is prohibited
under § 8(1) MDStV, because it violates the regulations in the Ger-
man penal code.207  The elements of Volksverhetzung, or Incitement
of the People, are fulfilled by promoting hatred against Jews and
foreigners.208  Stormfront also violates the penal code for using and
distributing symbols and propaganda material for unconstitutional
organizations, namely Nazi swastikas and symbols.209  Stormfront
also violates § 8(1)(2) by glorifying war, and § 8(1)(3)MDStV by en-
dangering children.210
The Blocking-Order concludes that Stormfront promotes na-
tional socialist ideology with the goal of establishing national social-
ist rule.  National socialist ideology stands in conflict with the moral
ideals of German social and legal order, and therefore is consid-
ered a great moral danger to children and youth.211
For similar reasons, the Lauck site is also prohibited under the
MDStV and the penal code.  The Lauck site features national social-
ist propaganda material, including a free download of Hitler’s Mein
Kampf, as well as national socialist songs, symbols, mobile phone
ring tones, articles, flyers for download and printing, and replicas
of Zyklon B gas canisters featuring the “KZ Auschwitz” logo.212
The Lauck site violates the penal code for incitement of the
people through the open approval of the annihilation of the Jews
205. Id.
206. Id. (the word used in the Blocking-Order is “Verteilerdrehscheibe”).
207. § 12 (1) MDStV (2002).
208. See Sperrungsverfu¨gung, supra note 156, at 2. See also § 130 StGB, supra note
101.
209. See § 86 StGB (use of symbols of unconstitutional organizations).
210. See http://www.stormfront.org. (last visited Sept. 15, 2004); see also §§ 12(1)-
(3) MDStV (2002).
211. Sperrungsverfu¨gung, supra note 156, at 1.
212. See http://www.nazi-lauck-nsdapao.com. (last visited Sept. 15, 2004).
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under the Third Reich.213  The use of Nazi symbols and distribution
of propaganda materials violates § 86 StGB.  The Lauck site glori-
fies war via the free distribution of Mein Kampf, certain music files,
and Music-CDs.214  As with Stormfront, the Lauck site is deemed to
promote national socialist ideology with the goal of establishing na-
tional socialist rule.  Because national socialist ideology promoting
the “Fu¨hrer Principle” (Fu¨hrerprinzip) conflicts with the moral ideals
of German social and legal order, it is deemed to be a great moral
danger to children and youth.215
According to § 5 of the MDStV, ISPs are answerable under law
for their own content (Content-Provider), and for foreign content
(Service Provider), only when the ISP has knowledge of the content
and it is possible to prevent access to the foreign content.216  If an
ISP acts merely as an Access Provider, providing Internet service
without knowledge of content, it is not responsible for foreign
content.217
It would seem that if an ISP is merely providing access to for-
eign content, it can escape legal liability.218  According to the inter-
pretation under § 18(3) MDStV, this is not so.219  If it is proven that
content cannot be blocked under § 18 as a Content Provider or as a
Service Provider, a mere Access Provider can still be held accounta-
ble for blocking content and treated as a Service Provider if it at-
tains knowledge of content consistent with the
Telecommunications Secrecy provision of the Telekommunikation-
sgesetz (TKG).220  Thus, if a mere Access Provider gains knowledge
213. See http://www.nazi-lauck-nsdapao.com.  Please note that the mere approval
of Nazi atrocities against the Jews is a prima facia violation of § 130 StGB.
214. Id.  See § 8 MDStV (1997) (MP3 music files for download include the Horst
Wessel Lied). See § 12 MDStV (2002).
215. http://www.nazi-lauck-nsdapao.com; see § 6, § 23 BVerfGE (1952).
216. See §§ 6, 9 MDStV (2002).
217. http://www.nazi-lauck-nsdapao.com (last visited Sept. 15, 2004); see § 5
MDStV (1997) (providing definitions of Content, Service, and Access Provider); see § 7
MDStV (2002).
218. See CompuServe I, Az. 8340 Ds 465 Js 173158/95; see also CompuServe II, 20 Ns
465 Js 173158/95.
219. § 22(3) MDStV (2002).
220. See Id.; see also Telekommunikationsgesetz [Telecommunications Law] [TKG]
25.07.1996 (BGB1. I S. 1120), amended by v. 31.01.2001 (BGB1. I S. 170), § 85 (Telecom-
munications Secrecy); see also Press Release, Bezirksregierung Du¨sseldorf nicht “die
Wacht am Rhein” im Internet- Du¨sseldorfer Regierungspra¨sident weist taz-Bericht
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of illegal content through any means, even knowledge attained
through the operation of the network, it can be forced to block
access to the illegal content under the MDStV.221
The Blocking-Order asserts that a direct request for assistance
from the American Service Providers would not be feasible.222 Ya-
hoo! v. LICRA indicates that European laws and judicial decisions
may not be upheld in the United States.223  As a result, German
ISPs cannot shift blame to the American content and service provid-
ers in an attempt to avoid liability under German law.
The MDStV makes clear that ISPs are only responsible for
blocking prohibited content if it is technologically possible and rea-
sonable to do so.224  According to the Blocking-Order, it is both
technically possible and reasonable to block access to the prohib-
ited web sites.  For § 5 of the MDStV to apply, there must be reason-
able technological means available to block access to the prohibited
content.225  Perhaps drawing from the conclusions of the French
court in Yahoo! v. LICRA,226 the district government lists a number
of technological means that may be employed to effectively block
access to Stormfront and the Lauck site.227  The ISPs may exclude
the domain from the Domain-Server (DNS), use Proxy-Servers, or
exclude the prohibited site through a router.228  ISPs are also re-
zuru¨ck, 70/2002 (Feb. 26, 2001), at http://www.brd.nrw.de/BezRegDdorf/hierarchie/
index.php.  The duty of Access Providers to block prohibited content under § 18(3)
MDStV (§ 22(3) MDStV 2002) is not unclear or uncharted legal territory. See also § 22
MDStV (2002). Compare TDG § 5(4), infra note 242, 255.
221. See Sperrungsverfu¨gung, supra note 156, at 6.  The District Government Du¨s-
seldorf points out that the ISPs were notified of the illegal sites in the Anho¨rungssch-
reiben in October 2001.  This would presumably make it difficult, if not impossible, for
the targeted ISPs to claim lack of knowledge of the prohibited sites.
222. Id.  In fact, the District Government Du¨sseldorf did request that Stormfront
and Lauck block access to the prohibited content.  Not surprisingly, there was no reac-
tion from either site.
223. See LICRA I, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181.
224. See § 5 MDStV (1997); see also § 7 MDStV (2002).
225. See Sperrungsverfu¨gung, supra note 156, at 6.  See also § 5(1)(2) MDStV
(1997).  The standard is whether it is “technologically possible and reasonable” to block
access or use of the prohibited content. See §§ 6,9 MDStV (2002).
226. See LICRA I, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
227. See Sperrungsverfu¨gung, supra note 156, at 6.
228. Id. at 6, 7.  The Sperrungsverfu¨gung does not detail the technical aspects of
blocking access to the web sites.  For the purposes of this article, it is sufficient to recog-
nize that the filtering occurs after the user sends the request for the web page and
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quired to block access to the sites via “mirror sites” and search en-
gines.229  Not surprisingly, and perhaps with good reason, ISPs in
Nordrhein-Westfalen have hotly disputed the technological effec-
tiveness of the proposed methods.230
According to the Blocking-Order, it is quite reasonable for ISPs
to implement the necessary filtering technology because, in a bal-
ancing test between the burden to ISPs and the potential danger to
society, the concerns of society and the protection of legally pro-
tected rights of persons are paramount.231  The Blocking-Order lists
in detail right-extremist related crime statistics to highlight the cur-
rent and future danger posed by right-extremist propaganda and
organizations.232  Therefore, the concrete danger to society posed
by right-extremists outweighs any burden imposed on the ISPs to
filter the prohibited sites.
The Blocking-Order acknowledges that the technical measures
employed by ISPs will largely affect the average Internet user, and
only a technologically savvy minority will be able to circumvent the
blockade.233  According to the Blocking-Order, it is not necessary
either prevents the request from reaching the desired server or prevents the content
from being transmitted to the user.
229. Id. at 10. See also Jonathan Zittrain and Benjamin Edelman, Localized Google
Search Result Exclusions, Berkman Center for Internet & Society, at http://
www.cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/google (last visited April 3, 2003).  French and
German Google search engines appear to filter search results for sites with content that
may be sensitive or illegal.
230. See Stefan Krempl, Netsperre fu¨r Fritschen Doof, 22.11.2001, at http://www.
heise.de/tp/deutsch/inhalt/te/11175/1.html (last visited Oct 24, 2002); Provider
halten Sperrung von Websites fu¨r unwirksam und unzumutbar, 13.11.2001, at http://
www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/22653 (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
231. See Sperrungsverfu¨gung, supra note 156, at 8 (“Da insofern der Rechtsextrem-
ismus auch eine konkretisierte Gefa¨hrdung fu¨r die o.g. Rechtsgu¨ter aber auch fu¨r
Leben und Gesundheit vieler Einzelner darstellt, wirkt die Belastung der Anbieter
durch eine Sperrung nicht so schwer, wie der Schutz der bedrohten Rechtsgu¨ter”). See
also, Stamm, supra note 20, at 25.  The freedom of speech per Article 5 is subject to the
Doppelbegru¨ndung doctrine, which calls for a balancing of the right to opinion against
other basic rights, such as the right to personality. See also Lu¨th, BVerfGE 7, 198-230
(1958).
232. See Sperrungsverfu¨gung, supra note 156, at 7, 8.  In 2000, 15,951 criminal acts
were committed which had proven or suspected right-extremist origins, while in 1999,
10,037 criminal acts were committed.  Most of the cases (6,823) were propaganda of-
fenses.  Further statistics include:  579 violent offenses, 508 attacks against persons, 385
people injured by right-extremists, and seven attempted murders.
233. Id. at 9.
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that access to the sites be completely blocked in order to justify the
implementation and execution of the law, only that progress is
made toward the ultimate goal of blocking illegal content.234
Therefore, it is enough that the average user will be prevented from
accessing the illegal content.
The Blocking-Order finally concludes that the freedom of ac-
cess to information under Article 5(2) of the Basic Law is not vio-
lated.235  Internet users have no constitutional claim to access
prohibited information, because the information itself is already il-
legal under the German penal code.236  However, in order to com-
ply with Article 5(3) of the Basic Law, the Blocking-Order exempts
schools and universities from the order, so long as the sites are ac-
cessed for art and scholarship, research or educational purposes.237
C. Objections and Answers:  Bu¨ssow holds his ground
1. Applicability of the MDStV
One of the first objections to Bu¨ssow’s Blocking-Order con-
cerned the applicability of the MDStV to all ISPs.238  To qualify as a
Provider under § 3(1) of the MDStV, the web sites must necessarily
qualify as Media Services.239  However, it is not clear that access to
all web sites can qualify as a Media Service, because not all sites
necessarily contain edited content.240  According to Jugend-
schutz.net, a youth protection watch-dog organization, some youth
protection organizations founded in other La¨nder have qualified
home pages as “Individual communications,” whereby they qualify
234. Id. at 8-9. See generally HANS D. JARASS & BODO PIEROTH, GRUNDGESETZ FU¨R DIE
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (5th ed., 2000).
235. See Sperrungsverfu¨gung, supra note 156, at 10. See Grundgesetz [GG] art. 5(2)
(“These rights shall find their limits in the provisions of general laws, in provisions for
the protection of young persons, and in the right to personal honor.”  The criminal
code falls within “provisions of general laws.”).
236. See Sperrungsverfu¨gung, supra note 156, at 10.  See, e.g., §§ 84, 85, 86, 130, 185,
189 StGB; see generally GjS.
237. Grundgesetz [GG] art. 5(3) (“Art and scholarship, research, and teaching
shall be free. The freedom of teaching shall not release any person from allegiance to
the constitution.”).
238. Thomas Hoeren, Stellungnahme zur geplanten Sperrungsverfu¨gung der Bezirksregie-
rung Du¨sseldorf (Hearing Nov. 13, 2001).
239. § 3(1) MDStV (1997, 2002), supra note 198.
240. Hoeren, supra note 238, at 2 (comparing web sites that have edited content
and sites which merely present a series of photos).
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as Tele-Services.241  If web sites qualify as Tele-Services, not Media
Services, the Blocking-Order cannot find a legal basis in the
MDStV.  Instead, it may be possible to regulate ISPs as providers of
Tele-Services under § 5(4) of the TDG, which provides similar pro-
visions as MDStV § 18(3) used in the Blocking-Order.242
The district government maintains that it can regulate all ISPs
under the MDStV.243  According to the district government’s Wider-
spruchsbescheid,244 a “reply to the appeal” of the ISPs, the ISPs do not
fall under the jurisdiction of the TDG or TKG245 as either Tele-
Service Providers or Network Providers.  Access Providers provide
protocol functions such as IP-Addresses, Name-Service, and Rout-
ing, and cannot be considered to be Network Providers who do not
provide these additional protocols for users.246  Further, Tele-Ser-
vice Providers offer services limited to the field of individual com-
munications, whereas Access Providers offer services which can be
accessed by multiple users simultaneously.247  Finally, both the TDG
and TKG contain provisions that seemingly exclude Access
Providers.248
241. Id. See § 2(2)(1) TDG; see also http://www.jugendschutz.net/teledienst.net
(last visited Sept. 15, 2004).
242. § 5(4) TDG (“The obligations in accordance with general laws to block the
use of illegal content shall remain unaffected if the provider obtains knowledge of such
content while complying with telecommunications secrecy under § 85 of the Telecom-
munications Act (Telekommunikationsgesetz) and if blocking is technically feasible
and can reasonably be expected.”). See § 22(3) MDStv 2002; see also Hoeren, supra note
238, at 4.
243. Widerspruchsbescheid zur Sperrverfu¨gung, Bezirksregierung Du¨sseldorf,
(Sept. 23, 2002), available at http://www.nps-brd.nrw.de/BezRegDdorf/hierarchie/auf-
gaben/Abteilung_2/Dezernat_21/Medienmissbrauch/Widerspruchsbescheid_zur_
Sperrverfuegun8229.php (last visited April 14, 2003).
244. See MATTHEW BENDER & CO., INC., BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY, § 7.05
(2002).  The ISPs initiated a protest procedure against the district government’s Block-
ing-Order by filing a complaint, or Widerspruch.  The Widerspruchsbescheid is the district
government’s reply to the ISPs appeal. The Widerspruchsbescheid  is the final administra-
tive procedure before resorting to the courts.
245. Telekommunikationsgesetz [Telecommunications Law] [TKG] v. 25.07.1996
(BGB1. I S. 1120), amended by  v. 31.01.2001 (BGB1. I S. 170).
246. Id. at 1.
247. Id. See § 2(1) TDG (“Teleservices within the meaning of § 2 (1) shall include
in particular . . .  services offered in the field of individual communication.”).
248. § 2(4)(1) TDG (“This Act shall not apply to . . . telecommunications services
and the commercial provision of telecommunications services under § 3 TKG”). See
§ 3(18) TKG (“‘telecommunications services’ [shall mean] the profit-oriented offer of
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In addition, the Widerspruchsbescheid points out that web sites
are not Individual Communications, because unlike letters or tele-
phone conversations, they are accessible to everyone.249  In this
sense, Access Providers do not violate Telecommunications Secrecy
if they block access to illegal web sites.250
Instead, web sites, according to Bu¨ssow, in particular Storm-
front and Lauck, are Media Services in that they are organized and
contain editorial content similar to a magazine.251  When combined
with right-extremist symbols and images, it becomes clear that the
sites intend to influence public opinion and are therefore mass
communications, not individual communications.252
Further, the regulation of Access Providers is consistent with
the intent and purpose of the MDStV.  Because it is not possible to
regulate content originating outside Germany, the MDStV contem-
plates the authority to require German ISPs to block foreign con-
tent that is illegal according to German law.253
2. Available Technology and Reasonableness?
German ISPs seized immediately upon the technological bur-
dens associated with blocking access to the Stormfront and Lauck
sites.  In particular, ISPs claimed that any measures taken would be
largely ineffective due to ever-changing IP-addresses, proxy servers
and mirror sites.254  Further, a 2000 decision by the Munich Re-
gional Appellate Court (OLG Mu¨nchen) declared that it is not nec-
essary for an ISP to consider every potential access alternative when
telecommunications, including transmission line offers to third parties); § 3(5) TKG
(“‘commercial provision of telecommunications services’ [shall mean] telecommunica-
tions offered on a sustained basis, including transmission line offers to third parties,
with or without the intention to realise profits”).
249. See Grundgesetz [GG] art. 10 (1) (“The privacy of correspondence, posts and
telecommunications shall be inviolable.”); § 85 TKG, supra, note 220.
250. § 85 TKG, supra note 220.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Widerspruchsbescheid, supra note 243, at 3 (justifying the applicability of
§ 18(3) MDStV (1997) currently § 22(3) MDStV (2002)). Id. at 4-5 (documenting un-
successful attempts to require the U.S. Providers and the F.C.C. to block the illegal
content.  Also a repetition of the unwillingness of the U.S. to enforce the French judg-
ment in LICRA I, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001)).
254. Hoeren, supra note 238, at 3.
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blocking illegal content.255  The Widerspruchsbescheid reiterated that
the technological means to block access to the site exist and are
reasonable to apply.256
3. Constitutionality
The Widerspruchsbescheid answers a number of constitutional ob-
jections raised by ISPs.  Access Providers claimed they were being
treated differently than Network Providers, and therefore the
Blocking-Order violated Article 3(1) of the Basic Law.257  The
MDStV contemplates three levels of responsibility for Content, Ser-
vice, and Access Providers, respectively.  Access Providers are not
singled out for sole responsibility under the MDStV and are thus
not the subject of unfair discrimination.
ISPs may not rely on the Article 5 exception for art and schol-
arship, research, and teaching.  This exception does not apply to
private entities that are not solely concerned with education or
research.258
The constitutional right to occupational freedom is also not
violated by the Blocking-Order.  Article 12 of the Basic Law is sub-
ject to the limitations of other laws, such as the MDStV.259  Because
the limitations imposed by the Blocking-Order are relatively un-
burdensome compared to the rights of youth protection, human
dignity, and public security, there is no constitutional claim under
Article 12.260
4. European Law
The Blocking-Order comports with European legal and politi-
cal principles.261  The E-Commerce Directive allows member states
to enact measures to combat hatred based on race, gender, relig-
255. Entscheidungen des Oberlandesgericht Mu¨nchen [OLG Mu¨nchen], Mul-
timedia und Recht [MMR], 10 (2000), 617 (CD-Bench case).  The decision was based on
TDG § 5(4) and is of questionable applicability).
256. Widerspruchsbescheid, supra note 243, at 5-7.  The same reasons given in the
Blocking-Order are repeated almost verbatim.
257. Id. at 7. See Grundgesetz [GG] art. 3(1) [All persons shall be equal before the
law].
258. Widerspruchbescheid, supra note 243, at 5-7. See Grundgesetz [GG] art 5(3).
259. Id. at 8. See Grundgesetz [GG] art. 12, 12(1).
260. Grundgesetz [GG] art. 12, 12(1).
261. Id.
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ion, or nationality.262  Article 12 of the Directive contemplates legal
action against Access Providers.263
D. The Administrative Courts: First Round Decisions
After exhausting all available administrative procedures with
the district government264 the ISPs filed suit in six administrative
courts (Verwaltungsgerichte) in Nordrhein-Westfalen.  Administrative
courts are courts of general jurisdiction and typically entertain dis-
putes between private parties and administrative agencies.265  Ad-
ministrative courts may decide constitutional questions so long as
both parties are not constitutional organs, such as the federal and
La¨nder governments.266  The primary focus of the administrative
court is to address whether a specific administrative agency decision
is “well-founded and supported by the applicable statute, regulation
and general principal of public law.”267
Many of the following cases make broad statements concerning
the legality of the Blocking-Order.  The standard of review applied
to administrative decisions is whether the agency has exceeded the
statutory limits of its discretion, or if the agency has abused its
power in contradiction to statutory intent.268  An ill-advised exercise
262. The Electronic Commerce Directive (E-Commerce Directive), 2000/31/EC,
art. 3(4)a)(i) (Original Journal L 178 9 2000) (“Member States may take measures to
derogate from paragraph 2 in respect of a given information society service if . . . neces-
sary for one of the following reasons:  public policy, in particular the prevention, investi-
gation, detection and prosecution of criminal offenses, including the protection of
minors and the fight against incitement to hatred on grounds of race, sex, religion or
nationality, and violations of human dignity concerning individual persons.”).
263. Id. art. 12(3) Directive 2000/31/EC at (l 178) 9 (“This Article shall not affect
the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in accordance with Member
States’ legal systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or to prevent an
infringement.”).
264. MATTHEW BENDER & CO., INC., BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY, § 7.05
(2002).  Before a claim may be made in an Administrative Court, the plaintiff must
exhaust all administrative procedures.  This was accomplished when the ISPs issued an
appeal (Widerspruch) to the district government, and the district government in turn
delivered its “reply to the appeal” (Widerspruchbescheid) refusing to amend the Blocking-
Order.
265. Id. at 2. See generally VwGO, v. 21,01.1960 (BGB1 I S. 17), amended by VwGO v.
13.06.1980 (BSB1 I S. 677).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 5.
268. Id. at 4.
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of discretion is not necessarily illegal, and courts may not review the
expediency of discretionary administrative decisions.269  If the ad-
ministrative decision is within the legal scope of discretion and is
based on proper consideration of fact and law, the court may not
“second guess” the agency.270  The net effect is that administrative
courts review administrative decisions with great deference.
To date, thirty-six out of seventy-six Access Providers in
Nordrhein-Westfalen have opposed the Blocking-Order, and ten
lawsuits have been filed.271  Since October 2002, there have been
seven court decisions regarding the Blocking-Order.  All but one,
Minden, have supported Ju¨rgen Bu¨ssow’s Blocking-Order.
1. VG Minden
The 11th Chamber of the Minden Administrative Court
(Verwaltungsgericht (VG) Minden) handed down the first decision
regarding the Blocking-Order on October 31, 2002.272  However,
the Minden court did not do much more than recognize that legal
issues exist.  The court did not make a decision as to the legality of
the Blocking-Order, saying that the order was “neither blatantly le-
gal [n]or blatantly illegal,” and did not approach the issue of
whether the MDStV or IuKDG was the correct statutory basis for the
Blocking-Order.273  Instead the court decided in favor of the ISPs,
stating that the interests of the ISPs outweighed public interests.274
The ISPs were not required to block the web sites pending further
judicial review.  The District Government of Du¨sseldorf immedi-
ately appealed the decision to the High Administrative Court in
Mu¨nster.275
269. Id. at 5.
270. MATTHEW BENDER & CO., INC., BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY § 7.05
(2002) at 1.
271. Sperrung der Internet-Angebote http://www.stormfront.org und www.nazi-
lauck-nsdapao.com, AZ 21.50.30-22/01 (Sept. 6, 2002).  The Sperrung ordered that all
internet providers in Nordrhein-Westfalen comply immediately with the Blocking-Or-
der of February 6, 2002, and the Widerspruchsbescheid of July 29, 2002.
272. Verwaltungsgericht Minden [Administrative Court Minden] [VG Minden], 11
L 1110/02 (October 31, 2002), available at http://www.artikel5.de/entscheidungen/vg-
minden_20021031.html (last visited Jan. 30 2003).
273. Id. at 2.
274. Id.
275. Id.
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2. VG Arnsberg
On December 6, 2002, the Administrative Court in Arnsberg
released the first decision in favor of the Blocking-Order.276  The
Arnsberg court held that the District Government had the proper
authority and interest sufficient to support issuing the Blocking-Or-
der.277  Further, the Arnsberg court found the interests of the ISPs
inferior to the public interest behind the immediate order to block
the extremist web sites.278  The court found that it was in the public
interest to be spared from Volksverhetzung (Incitement of the Peo-
ple) on the Internet, and that this interest could be served by block-
ing access to the extremist web sites.279
In response to the claim that the Blocking-Order imposed too
great a burden on the ISPs, the Arnsberg court forcefully re-
sponded, “Our legal system . . . does not protect business interests,
even those indirectly affected, if they contravene the free demo-
cratic constitutional order by promoting — regardless of the origin
— Incitement of the People.  Such Interests are never worthy of
protection.”280
3. VG Gelsenkirchen
Twelve days later, the ISPs received another blow from the Ad-
ministrative Court in Gelsenkirchen.281  Consistent with Minden
and Arnsberg, the Gelsenkirchen court found that the Blocking-
Order was not blatantly illegal.  More importantly, the court found
that offering access to the web sites named in the Blocking-Order
constituted a Media Service within the meaning of the MDStV
276. Verwaltungsgericht Arnsberg [Administrative Court Arnsberg] [VG Arn-
sberg], 13 L 1848/02 (Dec. 6, 2002), available at http://www.jurpc.de/rechtspr/200300
10.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
277. Id. at ¶7. See also § 80 VwGO.
278. Id. at ¶10.
279. Id. at ¶11.
280. Id. at ¶13 (“Unsere Rechtsordnung schu¨tz indessen keine wirtschaftlichen In-
teressen, die mittlebar betroffen sind, wenn durch Volksverhetzung gegen die freiheit-
liche demokratische Grundordnung- durch wen und von welchem Ort aus auch immer
verstoßen wird.  Solche Interessem sind nicht schu¨tzenswert.”).
281. Verwaltungsgericht Gelsenkirchen [Administrative Court Gelsenkirchen] [VG
Gelsenkirchen] 1 L 2528/02 (Dec. 18, 2002), available at http://www.artikel5.de/ent-
scheidungen/vg-gelsenkirchen_20021218.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-1\NLR104.txt unknown Seq: 45 15-DEC-04 8:40
2004] BATTLE AGAINST HATE-SPEECH ON THE INTERNET 397
§ 2(2).282  The Gelsenkirchen court concluded that offering access
to the banned Internet sites constituted a Distribution Service or an
On-Demand Service, and could thus be distinguished from Tele-
Services governed under the TDG.283  The MDStV concerns itself
with information and communications services offered to the gen-
eral public, while the TDG contemplates information and commu-
nications services limited to individual use.284  The crucial
distinction in the mind of the court was that the content found on
the Stormfront and Lauck sites was clearly directed towards and ac-
cessible by the general public in contrast to a small user group or
individuals.
The Gelsenkirchen court held that both the Stormfront and
Lauck sites contained content prohibited under § 12 MDStV.  As a
result, the Blocking-Order is supported under § 22 MDStV 2000.285
After examining the web sites, the court found numerous examples
of content which clearly violated the penal code and could endan-
ger children.286  The court found that all of the prohibited content
was intended to influence public opinion and therefore fell within
the purview of the MDStV.
Finally, the Gelsenkirchen court held that public interest in
preventing Volksverhetzung outweighs any interests of the ISPs.287
The court emphasized the importance of § 130 StGB’s prohibition
of Volksverhetzung, noting that in light of Germany’s history, there is
special responsibility to protect the German population from direct
attacks on human dignity.288  The court acknowledged the danger
of “poisoning the political climate if national-socialist violence and
tyranny were found to be harmless.”289
282. Id. at 3. See § 2(2) MDStV (1997, 2002), supra note 186.
283. VG Gelsenkirchen, supra note 281, at 3.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 4. See  § 12 MDStv (1997, 2002); see also § 8, 18 MDStV (1997).
286. VG Gelsenkirchen, supra note 281, at 4 (discussing examples including: the
use of swastikas, downloadable propaganda materials, a downloadable copy of Mein
Kampf, downloadable propaganda films such as The Wandering Jew. The court made a
detailed reference to  Gary Lauck’s photo, which shows him wearing a Hitler-like hair-
cut and mustache, and clothed in a khaki uniform shirt with a swastika armband).
287. VG Gelsenkirchen, supra note 281, at 6.
288. Id.  See also BGH 1 StR 184/00 (Dec. 12, 2000).
289. VG Gelsenkirchen, supra note 281, at 6.
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4. VG Du¨sseldorf
On December 19, 2002 the Administrative Court in Du¨sseldorf
handed down a detailed decision regarding the legality of the
Blocking-Order.290  Although the effect of the decision is substan-
tially the same as that of Arnsberg and Gelsenkirchen, the Du¨ssel-
dorf court explored in greater detail the relationship between the
MDStV and the IuKDG, as well as some constitutional issues not
discussed in previous decisions.  First, the Du¨sseldorf court took up
the issue of whether access to the prohibited web sites falls within
the scope of the MDStV or one of two federal statutory provisions,
namely the Telecommunications Law (TKG) and the IuKDG’s Tele-
Services Law (TDG).
The court determined that Access-Providers could either be
Media Services Providers under § 3(1) MDStV or Tele-Services
Providers under § 3(1) TDG, but could not be Telecommunica-
tions Service Providers under § 4 TKG.291  The court distinguished
Telecommunications Service as having a “technical-side,” such as
pure data transport, as opposed to “content offers,” either on an
individual or mass-communications basis.292  Because Internet Ac-
cess-Providers are more concerned with offering content, the TKG
can not be applied to Internet access service.293
The court acknowledged that the challenged Blocking-Order
could find a legal basis in either the MDStV or in the TDG in com-
bination with general legal rules.294  The court went on to note that
even if the ISPs were found to offer Tele-Services rather than Media
Services, the outcome would be substantially the same:  The ISPs
could be forced to block access to the prohibited sites.295
The Du¨sseldorf court examined the applicable provisions of
the MDStV and concluded that there is a clear legal basis for sup-
porting the Blocking-Order.  The court concluded that “The Media
Services Treaty 2002 — and not the TDG 2001 — is applicable to
290. Verwaltungsgericht Du¨sseldorf [Administrative Court Du¨sseldorf] [VG Du¨ssel-
dorf], 15 L 4148/02 (2002).
291. Id. at 13. See § 3(1) MDStV (1997, 2002).
292. VG Du¨sseldorf, 15 L 4148/02, 13.
293. Id. at 14.
294. Id.
295. Id. See Hoeren, supra note 238.
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the appellant [ISPs].”296  The Du¨sseldorf court found that Media
Services include, in particular, on-demand services, and distin-
guished Tele-Services as applicable to individual communications
or pure data transfer.297  As such, Media Services apply primarily to
services for the general public, while services which are primarily
for individual communication fall within the scope of the TDG.298
The court gave examples of communications services which have a
more concrete individual nature, such as telebanking, or the ex-
change of X-ray pictures and medical data between a hospital and
family doctor.299
However, when the services in question have the primary pur-
pose of providing access to sites that influence public opinion, then
the Media Services Treaty applies.300  Both the Stormfront and the
Lauck sites contain editorial content in combination with links to
additional sources and provide offers to purchase goods, and as
such, these sites cannot be considered to offer the “pure informa-
tion” contemplated by services covered under the TDG.301
The Du¨sseldorf court entertained the appellants claim that
they should be considered providers of Tele-Services under the
TDG.  The court concluded that even if this were the case, the dis-
trict government would still have the duty and authority to order
the ISPs to block the sites in question.302  On the basis of the juris-
diction granted under Article III of the State Treaty amending the
Broadcasting State Treaty of December 12, 2000,303 the state legisla-
ture intended to give local authorities, such as the Du¨sseldorf Dis-
trict Government, the authority to regulate both Media Services
and Tele-Services.304  The Du¨sseldorf District Government is
charged with the general duty to protect the public, and given the
illegality and public danger posed by both the Stormfront and
Lauck sites, the district government would be obliged to order the
296. VG Du¨sseldorf, 15 L 4148/02, 15.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 16.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. VG Du¨sseldorf, 15 L 4148/02, 24.
303. Staatsvertrag zur A¨nderung rundfunkrechtlicher Staatsvertra¨ge, v. 12.12.2000
(GV NRW S. 706).
304. VG Du¨sseldorf, 15 L 4148/02, 24.
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sites blocked under the authority of § 8(2) TDG in conjunction
with §§ 86, 130 StGB.305  The court noted that even if ISPs were
relieved of responsibility for the web site content under the TDG,
they would still be responsible to block access to the content under
the general laws, in particular the penal code.306  Thus, according
to the court, any exception for content liability under the TDG
would not, in the end, relieve the ISPs from liability under any
other statute prohibiting the web site content.  As such, the ISPs
still have a duty to block access to the Stormfront and Lauck sites.
The Du¨sseldorf court concluded that the content of Storm-
front and the Lauck site clearly violated § 12 MDStV and provisions
of the penal code.307  The district government had the authority to
order ISPs to block access to the sites under § 22 MDStV.  Both sites
violated §§ 86, 130 StGB by glorifying the murder of Jews under the
Nazis, and by using prohibited symbols of National Socialism, such
as the swastika.308  Therefore, there was ample justification to order
access to the web sites blocked under the MDStV.
The Du¨sseldorf court also found that it was technically possible
for the ISPs to block access to the prohibited web sites.309  While
the court noted that the available filtering technology would not be
completely effective, it was “a step in the right direction” and suffi-
cient to frustrate the average Internet user’s attempts to access the
prohibited sites.310  For this reason, the available technology is suffi-
cient to satisfy the requirements of § 22 MDStV.
The Du¨sseldorf court addressed several constitutional defenses
raised by the ISPs.  First, the Nordrhein-Westfalen ISPs claimed they
were not being treated equally under Article 3 of the Basic Law
because ISPs in the other La¨nder were not subjected to the Block-
ing-Order.  The court held that Article 3 only applies to the actions
of a public authority within its jurisdiction.311  The fact that all ISPs
305. Id. at 25.
306. Id. See §§ 9-11 TDG (exceptions for ISP content liability).
307. VG Du¨sseldorf, 15 L 4148/02, 17. See § 12 MDStV (1997, 2002).
308. VG Du¨sseldorf, 15 L 4148/02, 17. See § 18 MDStV (1997).
309. VG Du¨sseldorf, 15 L 4148/02, 20.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 21. See Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfG] Az. 2
BvR 1619, 1628, 1683 (2002); Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, BVerfGE
79, 127, 168 (1988).
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in Nordrhein-Westfalen were being treated equally is not disputed.
Therefore, an objection under Article 3 must fail.
The ISPs also raised defenses under Article 5 of the Basic Law,
including freedom of opinion, freedom of broadcasting, and the
prohibition against censorship.312  The Du¨sseldorf court held that
the provisions of Article 5 are subject to “general laws,” including
those for the protection of youth and those incorporated within  22
MDStV.313  The general laws provision is not intended to prohibit
opinions, but is instead intended to protect the continued exis-
tence of the state and its constitution against attacks, independent
of the concrete intent or effect of a statement of opinion.314  This is
particularly true when the opinions in question have been deemed
punishable under criminal law for endangering state and constitu-
tional principles protecting democracy.315
The court described the censorship provision in Article 5 as a
“Limitation-limit,” and not an original basic right.316  While the
censorship provision is clearly designed to prevent so-called pre-
ventative-censorship, it does not preclude a public authority from
prohibiting a broadcast, or in this instance a Media or Tele-Service
from providing access to material deemed criminally injurious to
the principles of a free democratic constitutional order.317
The ISPs also raised objections under Articles 12 and 14 of the
Basic Law.  Article 12, Occupational Freedom, guarantees the right
to freely choose an occupation or profession.318  The court found
that the Blocking-Order did not prohibit a choice of profession, but
rather regulated the practice of the ISPs’ occupation.  There was no
violation of Article 12 because all ISPs in Nordrhein-Westfalen are
312. VG Du¨sseldorf, 15 L 4148/02, 21. See Grundgesetz [GG] art. 5. See § 18
MDStV (1997).
313. Grundgesetz [GG] art. 5.
314. VG Du¨sseldorf, 15 L 4148/02, 21; see Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassung-
sgerichts, BVerfGE 47, 198 (232) (1978).
315. VG Du¨sseldorf, 15 L 4148/02, 21.
316. Id. at 22.
317. Id.
318. Grundgesetz [GG] art. 12 (stating that all Germans shall have the right freely
to choose their occupation or profession, their place of work, and their place of train-
ing.  The practice of an occupation or profession may be regulated by or pursuant to a
law).
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equally regulated and because there is no prohibition against the
choice of profession.
The ISPs raised a similar objection under Article 14, which
guarantees property and the right of inheritance.319  The court
found that Article 14, much as Article 12, allows the content and
limits of property to be defined by other laws, and concluded that
such a defining law was § 22 MDStV.320
The Du¨sseldorf court’s decision supported the legality of the
Blocking-Order and answered a number of legal and constitutional
questions not addressed by previous decisions.  However, even
though the Du¨sseldorf court clearly thought the ISPs were provid-
ing Media Services, by considering the possibility that the TDG
could potentially be applicable, it left the door open for future
courts to reconsider whether ISPs can, or should, be regulated
under the Tele-Services law.
5. VG Aachen
In the first decision of 2003, the Administrative Court in
Aachen dealt ISPs another blow in favor of Bu¨ssow’s Blocking-Or-
der.321  The Aachen court found that the Blocking-Order was
neither obviously illegal nor obviously legal.322  In congruence with
prior decisions, the Aachen court recognized that some legal issues
beyond the scope of the district government’s authority to issue the
Blocking-Order might be appealed to a higher court for final
disposition.
The Aachen court found that the MDStV, not the TDG, was
the correct legal foundation for the Blocking-Order.323  The
Aachen court focused, as did prior courts, on the difference be-
tween offering information in editorial form for the purpose of in-
fluencing public opinion and contrasted it with offering
319. Grundgesetz [GG] art. 14 (stating that property and the right of inheritance
shall be guaranteed.  Their content and limits shall be defined by the laws).
320. VG Du¨sseldorf, supra note 290, at 23. See § 18 MDStV (1997).
321. Verwaltungsgericht Aachen [Administrative Court Aachen] [VG Aachen], 8 L
1284/02 (Feb. 5, 2003), available at http://www.jurpc.de/rechtspr/20030075.htm (last
visited Feb. 25, 2003)
322. Id. at ¶4.
323. Id. at ¶7.
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information for individual use.324  When information is offered, ei-
ther as a distribution or on-demand service, in a way that could in-
fluence general public opinion, the MDStV must apply.  It is only
when the information is offered for individual use that the TDG
may apply.
The Aachen court found that the web sites targeted by the
Blocking-Order were intended, via their presentation and form, to
influence general public opinion and not for individual use.325
The court supported its finding by citing examples from the Lauck
site, such as a subtitle for an alleged interview with Osama bin
Laden, “Die for Israel?  No, thanks!”326  The court further noted
that the sites contained links to purchase related material which
strengthened the conclusion that the purpose of the sites is to influ-
ence public opinion.327
The Aachen court further found, without much difficulty, that
the content of both sites violated § 12 MDStV via violations of the
penal code.328  The sites were found to have violated § 130 StGB,
Incitement of the People, by offering videos such as The Wandering
Jew and texts such as Mein Kampf.329  The court also found that the
use of National Socialist symbols, such as swastikas and SS-runes,
violated § 86 StGB.330  The Aachen court further noted that even
discounting the aforementioned criminal violations, the sites would
still be prohibited under § 12 MDStV due to the danger posed to
children and youth, as well as injury caused to human dignity.331
Although the ISPs claimed that because the content originated
outside Germany it could not be held accountable under the penal
code, the court found that in the instant case, the prohibited con-
324. Id.
325. Id. at ¶8.
326. Id.
327. VG Aachen, supra note 321, at ¶8.
328. Id. at ¶9. See § 12 MDStV (1997,2002).
329. VG Aachen, supra note 321, at ¶9.  The court singled out a tag-line from The
Wandering Jew: “Animal lovers all over the world sharply protest the comparison of
(four-legged) rats with their infinitely worse two-legged species.”
330. Id. (noting in particular the collection of National Socialist graphic available
on Stormfront).
331. Id. See § 12 MDStV (1997, 2002).
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tent has made a successful entry into Germany, and could be sub-
jected to the provisions of the penal code.332
The Aachen court also rejected the ISPs claim that they could
not be held accountable for content originating in the U.S. because
they are mere Access Providers, and not Content or Service Provid-
ers under § 6 MDStV.333  The court concluded that Access Provid-
ers could still be regulated under § 7 MDStV because they
transmitted foreign content over a communications net, in this in-
stance by providing access to the use of foreign information.334
The Aachen court concluded that an order to block access to
the Stormfront and Lauck sites was justifiable, even if the available
technology would only be effective against the average Internet
user.  The district government has a duty to protect against general
threats and even against what may be perceived as a latent threat to
society.335  Therefore, it is sufficient to frustrate the average user’s
access, and it is not necessary to contemplate all possible ways the
prohibited sites might be accessed.336
Finally, the Aachen court forcefully addressed the ISPs’ com-
plaints that immediate compliance with the Blocking-Order would
damage their business interests.  The ISPs argued that, while the
matter was still being disputed in the courts, compliance with the
Blocking-Order be suspended because customers might switch to
other ISPs and because of the expenses related to blocking the pro-
hibited sites.337  The court responded, saying that the interests of
the ISPs were subordinate to the interests of society.338  The pri-
mary objective of § 130 StGB is to protect the public peace, and
from a historical and contemporary perspective, there is an overrid-
ing goal to promote harmony between different groups of people
living in Germany.339  As such, this supports blocking Internet sites
which glorify right-extremist ideology — not only the ideology on
National Socialism — which primitively propagates a hatred of the
332. VG Aachen, supra note 321, at ¶8. See BGH, 1 StR 184/00 (Dec. 12, 2000); see
also § 9(1) StGB.
333. VG Aachen, supra note 321, at ¶10. See § 5 MDStV (1997).
334. VG Aachen, supra note 321, at ¶10. See § 5 MDStV (1997).
335. VG Aachen, supra note 321, at ¶15.
336. Id.
337. Id. at ¶16.
338. Id.
339. Id.
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Jews and also attacks the dignity of other societal groups living in
Germany.340  The distribution of materials such as the song “The
Zillertaler Tu¨rkenja¨ger” and stickers featuring swastikas and the
phrase “Foreigners Get Out” poison the social climate, in light of
this danger, the interests of the ISPs are clearly subordinate.341
6. VG Ko¨ln
On February 7, 2003, the Administrative Court in Ko¨ln re-
leased its decision regarding the Blocking-Order and sided again
with the district government.342  The Ko¨ln court held that the
Blocking-Order was not obviously illegal, and that it was more likely
a legal application of the MDStV.343  The Ko¨ln court followed the
analysis of the Du¨sseldorf court, and determined that an Access-
Provider can be regulated under either the MDStV or the TDG, but
not the TKG.344  The Ko¨ln court distinguished the technical aspect
of a Telecommunications-Provider under the TKG from the more
content-oriented services provided by a Media Services or Tele-Ser-
vices Provider.  The court found that the form of the content on
the web page was germane to determining whether the Access Pro-
vider was providing a Media Service under the MDStV or a Tele-
Service under the TDG.345  The court’s review of both prohibited
web sites revealed that “without a doubt, the editorial form [of the
sites] was primarily intended to influence public opinion.”346  As
such, the MDStV, which applies to mass-communications, not the
individual communications contemplated under the TDG, provides
a sound basis for the Blocking-Order.  Like the Du¨sseldorf court,
the Ko¨ln court also noted that even if the TDG were applicable, the
Blocking-Order would still be supported.347
340. Id.
341. VG Aachen, supra note 321, at ¶16. (examples given by the court appear on
the Lauck site).
342. Verwaltungsgericht Ko¨ln [VG Ko¨ln] [Administrative Court Ko¨ln] 6 L 2495/02,
available at http://www.artikel5.de/entscheidungen/vg-koeln_20030207.html (Feb. 7,
2003).
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The Ko¨ln court also found that it was technologically possible
and reasonable to block access to the prohibited sites.348  The court
noted that the district government had requested voluntary compli-
ance without success.  In addition, the court specifically mentioned
that the two largest ISPs in Germany, AOL and T-Online, had vol-
untarily blocked access to the sites despite being outside the juris-
diction of the Blocking-Order.349
The Ko¨ln court also found that the interests of the ISPs did not
outweigh public interest in blocking access to the sites.350  The
goals of public peace, youth protection, and the protection of indi-
vidual rights such as human dignity, especially when viewed in light
of Germany’s history, took precedence over any interests the ISPs
may have.351
The Ko¨ln decision completed the first round of Administrative
Court decisions on the enforceability of Bu¨ssow’s Blocking-Order.
Only the Administrative Court in Minden offered any tentative sup-
port for the ISPs; the other courts, Arnsberg, Gelsenkirchen, Du¨s-
seldorf, Aachen, and Ko¨ln, albeit with some reservations, clearly
favored Bu¨ssow’s order.  The ISPs filed appeals to the High Admin-
istrative Court in Mu¨nster, which handed down its first decision on
March 19, 2003.352
7. OVG Mu¨nster
The Mu¨nster court affirmed the decision of the Arnsberg court
in favor of the Du¨sseldorf District Government and ordered that
access to the prohibited web sites be immediately blocked.353  The
Mu¨nster court repeated that public interests outweigh any interests
of the ISPs and affirmed the legality of the Blocking-Order under
the MDStV.354  The court affirmed that the content of both web
sites violate the provisions of the MDStV and the StGB, citing exam-
348. VG Ko¨ln, supra note 342, at II(2)(a).
349. Id.
350. Id. at II(2)(b).
351. Id.
352. Oberverwaltungsgericht Mu¨nster [High Administrative Court Mu¨nster] [OVG
Mu¨nster], 8 B 2567/02 (Mar. 19, 2003), available at http://www.artikel5.de/ent-
scheidungen/ovg-muenster_20030319.html (Mar. 19, 2003).
353. Id. See VG Arnsberg, 13 L 1948/02.
354. OVG Mu¨nster, supra note 352.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-1\NLR104.txt unknown Seq: 55 15-DEC-04 8:40
2004] BATTLE AGAINST HATE-SPEECH ON THE INTERNET 407
ples that satisfied the requirements for incitement of the people,
unconstitutional organizations, the glorification of war, and the en-
dangerment of children and youth.355  The court further affirmed
that it was technologically possible and reasonable for the ISPs to
block access to the prohibited sites; it quoted the Arnsberg court
finding that even if not all users could be prevented from accessing
the sites, it was a “step in the right direction.”356  However, as a
small consolation to the ISPs, the Mu¨nster court left open for ap-
peal the question of whether a mere Access Provider could be held
accountable for content originating outside Germany.357
For the time being, virtually all access to Stormfront and Nazi-
Lauck is blocked in Nordrhein-Westfalen.  Ju¨rgen Bu¨ssow’s Block-
ing-Order has survived the initial scrutiny of the Administrative
Courts and the High Administrative Court in Mu¨nster.  However, it
must be remembered that these initial court decisions did nothing
more than decide that it was permissible to block access to the sites
under the MDStV.
Following the OVG Mu¨nster decision, the case will return to
the Administrative Court in Arnsberg to consider principle legal is-
sues of the ISPs’ appeal to the Blocking-Order.  The Arnsberg court
will examine the Blocking-Order in greater detail and consider the
applicability of the MDStV, the TDG, and constitutional objections
under Article 5 of the Basic Law.
Following a second decision from the Arnsberg court, the ISPs
may again appeal to the High Administrative Court in Mu¨nster.
From there, if the decision is again unfavorable, the ISPs may ap-
peal to the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht)
in Leipzig.  Only after a decision by the Federal Administrative
Court may the ISPs appeal to the Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) in Karlsruhe.
The administrative court decisions to date have done little
more than affirm the authority of Ju¨rgen Bu¨ssow and the Du¨ssel-
dorf District Government to regulate ISPs under the State Treaty
on Media Services.  However, this is not an insignificant finding, as
the courts have maintained continuity with the historical develop-
355. Id.
356. Id.  See VG Arnsberg, 13 L 1948/02.
357. OVG Mu¨nster, supra note 352.
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ment of German media law which allocates the authority to regu-
late media content with the State rather than the federal
government.  It is likely that the Nordrhein-Westfalen ISPs will
continue to appeal the decisions of the administrative courts with
the hope that subsequent proceedings will focus more heavily on
the constitutional issues of free speech and freedom of the press.
However, as outlined in Part II of this article, the German courts
have not been receptive to including racist or extremist speech
within the sphere of speech protected under Article 5 of the Basic
Law.  Further, it would be difficult to show that Stormfront and
Nazi-Lauck do not violate any provisions of the German penal code.
In these respects, the Nordrhein-Westfalen ISPs face an uphill
battle.
There are at least two arguments that favor the ISPs.  First, the
ISPs may have a valid argument that the technological means re-
quired to block access to the web sites will either be ineffective or
will become so burdensome that few ISPs will be able to survive
financially.  The Internet is a quicksilver environment where tech-
nology becomes obsolete in stunningly short periods of time.  It is a
strong possibility that by the time the court proceedings are con-
cluded, the filtering technology proposed in the Blocking-Order
will be obsolete.  Should the ISPs be forced to continually develop
new filtering technology to keep pace with those who are deter-
mined to circumvent such technologies?
Second, the Blocking-Order only requires that access to two
web sites be blocked.  The Stormfront and the Lauck sites are cer-
tainly powerful examples of hate-speech on the Internet, but they
are only representative of thousands of such web sites.  An impor-
tant question for the courts to address is how to differentiate be-
tween Stormfront, which is in clear violation of German law, and
those web sites which contain similar content in an entirely differ-
ent context, such as sites containing historical documents or ac-
counts of Nazi atrocities.  While Bu¨ssow’s Blocking-Order may
appear sound in theory, the practical application of such an order
could yield over-broad results significantly reducing the positive so-
cial and/or democratic effects of the Internet.
It is also important to consider the effects of the Blocking-Or-
der within Germany and on the world stage.  If the Blocking-Order
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were ultimately upheld in the courts, it could conceivably be imple-
mented in the other German States.  The MDStV is a treaty between
the States, but the extent to which the other German states would
implement a MDStV-based Blocking-Order is unclear.  One possi-
ble scenario is that the various German states enact Blocking-Or-
ders of varying degrees or against different web sites.  Some may
not issue a Blocking-Order at all.  This possibility could create a
confusing regulatory regime within Germany and cause significant
difficulties for ISPs operating in several States.
Finally, from a global perspective, Bu¨ssow’s Blocking-Order ap-
pears to fit nicely with U.N. and E.U. law prohibiting racist and
xenophobic speech.  If successful, Bu¨ssow’s Blocking-Order may be
copied in other countries in Europe and around the world.  This
would result in a “Balkanization” of the Internet — different regu-
latory regimes would apply to different geographical parts of the
globe.  The problem is, the Internet does not respect geographical
boundaries and does not exist in any one place.  If such a splintered
regulatory system were to develop, ISPs could face multiple content
filtering requirements and varying levels of liability, both civil and
criminal, worldwide.  Compliance with multiple regulatory regimes
would be a financial and technological nightmare for any ISP seek-
ing to do business internationally.
V. CONCLUSION
Will the Internet remain a realm free from governmental inter-
ference?  Will the Internet be “Balkanized” into national spheres of
influence where content is regulated according to national social,
moral, and legal standards?  Will Germany, and potentially the Eu-
ropean Union, take a stand against the First Amendment protec-
tion granted to hate-speech?  These are some of the larger
questions that may be answered in Germany’s higher courts.
The separation of legislative competence between the Bund
and La¨nder, as formalized in the early broadcasting cases, will likely
be applied to Internet regulation.  Legislative competence over me-
dia content will remain in the hands of the La¨nder, and Internet
content will be subject to regulation under the MDStV rather than
any federal law.  To do otherwise would require a reinterpretation
of the Basic Law and overturning what has been a stable, successful
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model of media regulatory structure.  Further, Germany would
have to reconsider its penal code and its attitudes towards National
Socialism and hate-speech.  In light of the Auschwitz Lie case, and
German history, it is not likely that German courts will allow sites
like Stormfront or Nazi-Lauck any protection under Article 5.  Fur-
ther, European Union Directives lend support to Germany’s hard
line stance against hate-speech.  Ju¨rgen Bu¨ssow’s Sperrungsverfu¨gung
will, more likely than not, survive judicial scrutiny.358
358. In Nordrhein-Westfalen, Don Black’s and Gerhard Lauck’s First Amendment
privileges have been revoked.
